Daily Report

East Europe

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Albania: Presidents Hail Plan for U.S. Office in Kosovo

AU1402102996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The President's Press and Information Office reports that Sali Berisha, president of the Republic of Albania, received Kosovar President Rugova today.

After discussing the course and the development of reforms in Albania at this meeting, both presidents focused on the political situation in the region, created after the Dayton agreement and the deployment of the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops in Bosnia. They hailed President Clinton's decision to open an information office in Kosova, as well as the decision by President Clinton's administration and the European Union that the former Yugoslavia's integration into the international community should be conditional on reaching a solution on the Kosova problem, in conformity with the respect for the rights and freedoms of Albanians in Kosova.

Both presidents agree that no time should be lost in initiating a constructive dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade in the presence of a third party.

Albania: Turkey Signs Consular Convention Protocol

AU1402104596 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A protocol to exchange the instruments for ratifying a consular convention between the Republics of Albania and Turkey was signed at the Foreign Ministry today. For the Albanian side, the exchange protocol was signed by Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi and, for the Turkish side, by Metin Ornekkol, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Turkey in our country.

The consular convention with Turkey was drafted on the basis of the main principles defined by the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. When it takes effect, this convention will contribute towards giving new impetus to the relations between our country and Turkey in the fields of economy, trade, and cultural, technical, and scientific cooperation. Apart from this, it will provide a possibility to act more efficiently on the disposal of Albanian national's property in Turkey.

Albania: PS Policy on Privatization Criticized

AU1002165896 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 8 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Shpetim Luku: "Gramoz Ruci Threatens Property"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist bosses have repeated their promise to "review and redress privatization." Following the statement of Dritero Agolli, Socialist Party [PS] Presidium member, in Sarande, "We will nationalize property privatized with dirty money," and the expression of Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi's fear that businessmen will vote for the Democratic Party [PD], another PS bigwig has now pontificated on the same issue. Gramoz Ruci announced at the PS conference in Vlore, "Privatization will be corrected by law." In other words, the Socialists will revoke privatization by law. It is now obvious that these incessant statements are an augury that is still for the moment merely a threat to the class of proprietors and businessmen. The ascent to power of the unreconstructed Socialists would be accompanied by laws outlawing privatization. What would this mean?

Farewell to private property, farewell to free initiative. If privatization is something vital to accomplish the transformation of the economy, the fulfillment of the PS's promise would discount the four years of economic reforms based on privatization. If privatization is a necessary process to overcome the economic crisis and to create jobs, its revocation would plunge the country again into crisis, chaos, and insecurity. If privatization has enabled the democratic state to perform such obligations as the material rehabilitation of former victims of political persecution and the method of auctions has created a new class of capitalists, then the fulfillment of Ruci-style promises would turn businessmen and property owners back into a proletariat. If privatization is instilling a new way of thinking based on property, and profit and has encouraged the idea that in a market economy you are responsible for your own prosperity, then a commitment to its revocation means to abolish these incentives to progress. The PS's message is: Farewell private property, farewell free initiative.

Privatization is a process for the country's development, and its revocation would mean regression. At a time when the PD is insisting on pressing ahead with privatization because it creates more efficient structures, the PS offers its alternative of canceling privatization. In the end, the PD distinguishes itself from the PS precisely because it looks ahead, not backward.

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Albania: Poll Reveals 8 Percent 'Trust' Government

AU1302110196 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 10 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Emin Barci: "Only 8 Percent Trust the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A poll conducted by the Association for Democratic Culture has shown that of those asked only 8 percent trust the Meksi government. The poll was conducted in the city of Tirana during December. One thousand questionnaires were distributed, to be filled in anonymously and delivered to the association's offices. More than 500 questionnaires were returned, and processing the data produced many figures.

The section of the questionnaire about the judicial system was most disturbing. Sixty percent called the work of the judicial system poor, 26 percent average, and only 6 percent considered it good. Answering another question about the judiciary, 65 percent thought that it was influenced, which, in plain Albanian, means subordinate. Only 19 percent thought it was independent, and 15 percent expressed no view. These figures could not be otherwise, following the struggle waged by the president and the Democratic Party [PD] since 1992 to put the courts and the judiciary under their control. In 1992, Berisha asked for the dismissal of Procurator-General Maks Haxhia. The government later organized six-month courses to make investigators, procurators, and judges out of agronomists, veterinarians, engineers, and former political prisoners. Finally, the dismissal of Zef Brozi as chairman of the Court of Cassation and several successive anticonstitutional verdicts by the Constitutional Court finally obliterated Albanians' faith in the independence of the courts.

Only 14 percent judged the work of the parliament to be good, while 40 percent considered it average and 37 percent poor.

The government emerges worse than the parliament. Forty-seven percent of those polled called its work poor, 36 percent average, and only 12 percent considered it good.

As for the police, 37 percent called its work poor, 36 percent average, and 1 percent good. The fact that only 1 percent are satisfied with the work of the police compared with 73 percent considering it average or poor shows that the police are still not up to their duties in the struggle against crime and in equally enforcing the laws for everybody.

Among problems worrying today's citizenry, 47 percent mentioned corruption and 50 percent mentioned organized emigration, one of the only items in the "pact between the PD and the electorate" for which nothing has been done. However, electricity ranked as the main problem for 57 percent of those polled. Fifty percent had incessant problems, which they ascribed to the situation the country is passing through. Twenty-six percent looked to the president to solve these problems. On one hand, this figure might be interpreted as a sign of loyalty to the president. On the other hand, it might be taken as "trust" in a strong hand that might simultaneously be the president, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the chairman of the ruling party, and supreme judge. This might be why, in solving problems, only 8 percent trust the government, 10 percent the parliament, and 9 percent local government.

A part of the poll was also devoted to the constitution. Only 20 percent think that the constitution should be approved again by a referendum, i.e., share the view of Berisha and the PD. About 22 percent think that it should be approved by parliament and 42 percent think that it should be approved initially by parliament and then at a referendum. The two latter replies show that 64 percent support the opposition's proposals for approving the constitution.

As for the forthcoming elections, 77 percent have decided to vote, 15 percent are undecided, and 7 percent are determined not to vote. There are no figures for the possible election results of the political parties. The December issue of the association's newsletter, VIZION, reported the start of the poll and listed questions about the parties and political personalities. It is still not clear why these figures have not been published.

As for the press, 58 percent prefer to read independent newspapers and only 32 percent party newspapers. In the next three to four years, 50 percent expect improvement, while 40 percent do not expect any great changes. If we connect the reply to this question to the problems singled out by those polled, such as electricity, corruption, unemployment, organized emigration, the subordination of the judiciary, low trust in the government, and so forth, one cannot reach the conclusion that more than 50 percent will vote for the PD again. Nor can one say that 40 percent will vote for the opposition. An analysis of the poll shows that the truth might be the other way around.

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Bulgaria: Videnov Says FRY Visit 'Very Successful'

AU1402092696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0500 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov returned from Belgrade. Apart from ministers and deputy ministers, the prime minister was accompanied on his official visit to the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] by a large group of representatives from Bulgarian business circles. Prime Minister Videnov assessed the visit as very successful. During the visit, a treaty was signed on the mutual protection of investments and an agreement was reached that other intergovernmental documents would be signed soon, in March.

[Begin Videnov recording] The most important result of this visit was the common, strong conviction expressed in our talks that the peace process in the Balkans is irreversible, that the peace agreements reached will be fulfilled, and that we already have all possibilities, the common will, and a number of specific ideas on ways in which we can guarantee stability and development in the period following the conflict. In our view, this might be achieved primarily by strengthening mutual trust and renewing the common Balkan process—the all-Balkan dialogue, and we are extremely pleased by the support we received for our idea to hold a regular meeting with the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries in Sofia this year and for preparations to sign a treaty of friendship and good-neighborliness with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Our [words indistinct] are central regarding communications in the Balkans. There are possibilities for us to assimilate the great achievements that have been made here, especially in rail transportation in the FRY. We are also interested in the achievements in the energy industry field, and will start very actively to exchange information and to coordinate our efforts in developing the future infrastructure system for the entire region. [end recording]

Prime Minister Videnov made the above statement in the final hour of the Bulgaria Government delegation's visit. FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic described the two days of talks as frank, producing concrete results both for the political dialogue and for economic relations.

[Begin Kontic recording in Serbo-Croatian fading into announcer-read Bulgarian translation] I hope that we will soon create a situation in which our business circles will restore trade to the level existing before the embargo period and, as we have just agreed, will achieve a doubling of our trade exchange to $500 million. We established with great satisfaction that it is necessary to raise the level of our diplomatic relations to ambassadorial rank, the FRY prime minister said. In his assessment, he also mentioned two important topics that were discussed in a spirit of mutual understanding: the need to stabilize the peace process and the regional integration of the Balkans.

Bulgaria: Deputy Poptodorova Views NATO Participation

AU1302142596 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 6 Feb 96 pp 12-13

[Interview with Elena Poptodorova, deputy of the democratic left parliamentary faction, by Khristina Vladimirova; place and date not given: "'NATO Will Be the Link to European Security and Cooperation'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Vladimirova] What is your attitude toward NATO?

[Poptodorova] The political forces now do not have a common position on this issue. The 1993 declaration was a very good document for that time, but in the meantime things have moved forward. I am convinced that, regardless of the price and, if you will—the internal political price that must be paid—there will be a decision, and it will be adopted by a consensus. At present, negotiations on this issue have been proposed to us and we cannot say "no." One can say "no" to a conflict or confrontation, but saying "no" to negotiations is a totally losing position. This is the source of my hope that things will move forward, despite all the difficulties.

[Vladimirova] What is Bulgaria's interest?

[Poptodorova] Bulgaria's interest is to follow its European orientation. However, it is obvious that Russia is a basic factor of European security. This issue cannot be resolved without its participation. This became evident a few days ago when Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe. This was perhaps the most important event in European politics.

[Vladimirova] Will it be difficult to reach a consensus in the Bulgarian Socialist Party on the NATO issue?

[Poptodorova] For obvious reasons, this will not be an easy process. Unfortunately, instead of calmly discussing the possible guarantees this alliance could give us, NATO became a symbol. I do not mean NATO in itself, but NATO as an element of the European security system. In Bulgaria, NATO became a symbol which separates communism and anticommunism. If you are for NATO—you are an ardent democrat and anticommunist. If you are against NATO—you are a retrograde and a fierce communist. This is the problem. It is a matter of pure existentialism. This is not puzzling, since for

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many years we used to think according to schemes. [passage omitted]

[Vladimirova] How do you view the negotiations with NATO?

[Poptodorova] NATO will be one of the links to European security and cooperation. Therefore, I think that the obstacles are of a purely psychological nature. The negotiations will continue. Bulgaria must negotiate for its security and pose certain conditions. This is perhaps the first time that we could take part in negotiations and say: "We do not want any nuclear weapons on our territory. We do not want our territory to be used for military actions against another country." Those are conditions which we not only can but must pose against the background of our region's vulnerability and lack of security. Other countries will probably pose other conditions. For me it is a positive fact that NATO prepares an individual package for each country that participates in the Partnership for Peace program. Our national interest and the guarantees that are offered to us must be outlined clearly in the negotiations. On Friday [2 February], the Council of Ministers adopted a decision on this issue.

However, in any event, we must take Russia's position and interests into consideration. This is also the position of the U.S. Administration and the European governments. This position was demonstrated in Strasbourg. This decision was adopted regardless of the contradicting opinions that were expressed. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Interior Minister Presents New Police Chiefs

AU1302065196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Feb 96 p 2

[DUMA PRESS staff report: "Nachev Presented New Chiefs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 5 February, Interior Minister Nachev met for over one hour with the leading officers of the Sofia Police Directorate to present to them the new Sofia police chief, Colonel Krasimir Petrov. I have known Col. Petrov for more than 15 years; to date he has always coped well in critical situations, and I believe that he will gain control of the situation in combating crime in the capital, Minister Nachev told journalists yesterday when he left the police directorate building. The minister believes that he is a determined officer with initiative and a true professional. Lyubomir Nachev is also counting on the help that Col. Petrov will receive from Col. Yordan Kovachev, the outgoing chief of the Sofia Police Directorate, who will be reassigned to responsible work within the Interior Ministry. However, the minister refused to give any details about Col. Kovachev's new post. The new and former Sofia police chiefs both accompanied the minister to his silver Mercedes. At one moment, the three of them were aligned as if for a photo, and Nachev kindly allowed the television camera team to photograph them.

The new commander of the Special Antiterrorist Unit also took up his duties yesterday. His name is Lieutenant Col. Iliyan Bankov Stoyanov, and previously he served as officer in charge of a unit of the Red Berets, Minister Nachev announced. Yesterday, Nachev personally introduced the Red Berets to their new commander. I will give a news conference very soon, Col. Krasimir Petrov told curious journalists yesterday, adding that, at present, he needs to continue his talks with his predecessor. Interior Minister Nachev also promised the journalists that, next week, the list of criminals with pending cases will be in the hands of the prosecution service.

Bulgaria: Energy Official, WANO on Restoring Contacts

AU1002011696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 9 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The resumption of cooperation between the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant and WANO, the World Association of Nuclear Operators, which was suspended when the French team withdrew from the plant last October, was discussed at a meeting today between Rumen Ovcharov, first deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, on the one side, and WANO President Remi Carl and Mr. Madden, director of the WANO Coordinating Center, on the other. The break in relations with WANO was not Bulgaria's fault and we have nothing against restoring them, Ovcharov said.

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Czech Republic: Havel Returns Home After Surgery

LD1302181396 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Vaclav Havel today underwent an urgent operation in a Prague hospital. Pavel Fischer from the news department of the presidential office:

[Fischer] The medical report says that the operation was necessary because a polyp in his mouth suddenly started to bleed. Havel was operated on in an outpatient department and is now being looked after at home. The treatment and convalescence will take about two weeks.

Czech Republic: Klaus on Application for EU Membership

LD1302210296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 13 Feb 96

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Jaroslav Skalicky; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Skalicky] [Passage omitted] Prime Minister, you have allowed for the possibility of holding a referendum on whether the Czech Republic should join the EU. My question is: Should it have been done before the application was submitted, and would such words from you make the EU doubt whether we are really seriously interested in joining the EU?

[Klaus] The EU will not doubt our intentions because of this. Different EU countries vary in the way they approach this issue: Some request a referendum, others do not dare to do so because they worry about its outcome. Our behavior is normal in this respect. As to the question of whether we should allow someone to dictate to us whether we need to hold a referendum on this issue, I must be merciless and say that it is entirely our own business. This is an answer to one of your questions.

I do not think we should hold a referendum on whether we should apply to the EU. The application has no immediate legal implications and creates no legal claims. It has no legal significance on its own. The Czech Republic has not subscribed itself to anything; we have not diminished our sovereignty by submitting the application. My deepest conviction is that there is nothing to hold a referendum about. [passage omitted]

I keep asking myself questions about this issue. I think more openly and honestly than other politicians, therefore it would not be correct to say that I am against a referendum. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Klaus on BIS Report, Leak of Contents

AU1402110796 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 9 Feb 96 p 3

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Ladislav Jakl; place and date not given: "Disagreement With the Concept of the BIS Report"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vaclav Klaus does not share the "conspiratorial world view," according to which history is controlled by agents. In an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY, the prime minister also expresses the opinion that philosophizing does not belong in the BIS [Security Information Service] annual report.

[Jakl] There is talk about KGB capers here. If such activities actually went on, could they have a more pronounced effect on the political scene? Or would you rather say that the factor of spontaneous human activity dominates here, too?

[Klaus] The first question is whether such activities actually take place. Another question is whether, even if they were ideally conceived and absolutely genial, they could influence the mood of the voters. The unequivocal answer to the second question is no. I simply believe that this can only be said by someone who has a very peculiar understanding of society and history. I once termed it a conspiratorial world view. I answer the first question by insisting that I really am not convinced about the activities of the KGB here, and I have seen no evidence that would convince me.

[Jakl] How would you assess the leak of the text of the BIS annual report to the public?

[Klaus] As soon as more than one person has access to the material, the source of the leak is difficult to find. If all of the ministers, the president of the Republic, and the Chamber of Deputies received a copy each, that makes a minimum total of 21 copies, which are immediately disseminated further. A minister lets his two advisers read it to discern all of the main issues pertaining to him , his ministry, and so forth. That already triples the number.

[Jakl] Is it necessary to better control the circle of people who receive the report or, because of their number, contemplate what can be included in the text promulgated in this fashion?

[Klaus] I believe it is also a matter of the concept of the report. An annual report should not philosophize but, rather, provide pure, empirical data: We spent so much, we had so many employees, we undertook so many operations, so many were successful and so many failures, we turned to the courts so many times and

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to the police that many times. I would not include philosophizing about international politics and general matters of contemporary macropolitics in any annual reports.

Czech Republic: Officials Comment on Leaked BIS Report

AU1402111696 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 9 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by Ondrej Neumann and Ladislav Jakl: "Devaty's Uncertain Fate at the Head of BIS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding the annual BIS [Security Information Service] report, which contains the claim that there is a danger that Russian agents would influence the elections, speculation emerged among the members of the Cabinet regarding the recall of the BIS head, Stanislav Devaty. Nevertheless, so far, the government has not discussed his remaining at the helm of BIS.

Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus expressed sharp disagreement with the character of the annual report of BIS in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY. He believes, above all, that "philosophizing" about macropolitical influences has no place there. Klaus considers it inappropriate to include speculation in the annual report about Russian agents intending to influence the elections in the Czech Republic. According to LIDOVE NOVINY sources, these shortcomings of the report were even the reason for the supreme government officials to consider the recall of Devaty from the post of interim head of BIS.

Josef Lux, deputy prime minister and chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], described the leak of information from the annual report about the attempts of the Russian secret service to influence the elections in the Czech Republic as scandalous. According to Lux, however, for the KDU-CSL, the recall of Devaty from the post of interim head of BIS is not on the "agenda of the day." "The entire issue is very peculiar, and I do not know who initiated it or whom it is to serve. If there are any agents, and I believe it very likely, it is the duty of BIS to stay on their heels rather than scare people," Lux told LIDOVE NOVINY.

Although Interior Minister Jan Ruml admitted that, while the "temporal nature" of Devaty's position is subject to political considerations within the Civic Democratic Party, these considerations, according to him, have no immediate connection with the annual report. "I see no reason for Devaty's resignation," Ruml said.

Ruml's stand is contrary to the opinion of his party boss and prime minister, Klaus, who, according to LIDOVE NOVINY sources, does consider the report and the leak of information about its content a reason to reflect on the appropriateness of Devaty's remaining at the helm of BIS. Aside from Klaus, the fact that the report contains unsupported "hypotheses" in addition to documented information has been criticized in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY by Ivan Masek, deputy and member of the parliamentary Commission for Monitoring the Activity of BIS, who is a member of the Civic Democratic Alliance.

According to Masek, similar hypotheses have no place in the annual report. "Where there is nothing to be written about the actual activity, the space is filled in this manner," Masek said. In this context, Masek expressed his surprise that, according to his sources, during the entire time of its existence, BIS has not discovered a single agent of a foreign secret service. At the same time, Masek said that he has no information on the Civic Democratic Alliance's considering Devaty's recall right now.

Yesterday the Commission for Monitoring the Activity of BIS discussed the leak of information on the content of the report. According to its chairman, Tomas Svoboda (Christian Democratic Party), the members are "almost certain" that the information was not leaked on the parliament floor. Svoboda reported that the commission will ask the BIS head for a statement on the measures undertaken to investigate the leak of information. Svoboda and Masek believe that the BIS annual reports do not need to be described as top secret.

LIDOVE NOVINY has not managed to obtain the stand of Stanislav Devaty, whose membership in the Civic Democratic Party is frozen. He has refused to comment on the affair ever since the information about it was published.

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Slovakia: Russian Embassy's Version of Envoy's Interview

AU1302131296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 12 Feb 96 p 4

[Unattributed article in the "We Have Observed" column: "From the MLADA FRONTA DNES Interview With S. Yastrzhembskiy, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Slovakia"; place and date not given—published in Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 8 February]

[FBIS Translated Text] An authorized passage according to the Russian Embassy:

"As far as Russia's relations with Slovakia are concerned, today we can state with satisfaction that they are developing progressively in the political, economic, cultural, and other spheres. I would even venture to state that Moscow and Bratislava, as the first in the post-Soviet region, have managed to create a new model for bilateral relations. Typical traits of this model are steadfast respect for the national interests of our partner; deideologization; support and a new legal basis (in three years, more than 70 agreements have been signed); an ongoing search for new forms of cooperation; and the formulation of a mechanism for making mutually advantageous decisions (an intergovernment commission, a joint working group for military-technical cooperation, joint commissions involving the Slovak and Russian regions). The direct involvement of the two countries' prime ministers in this process has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the dynamism of bilateral cooperation."

The same passage in MLADA FRONTA DNES:

"As far as Slovakia is concerned, we can state with satisfaction that these factors are ceasing to play a dominant role. I would even venture to say that Moscow and Bratislava have managed, as the first duo in the postsocialist region, to create a new model for mutual relations. Undoubtedly, Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Meciar are primarily responsible for this."

An authorized passage according to the Russian Embassy:

"We are well aware of the policy statement of the Slovak Republic Government, in which it talks about its objective of integrating into NATO. All the same, we are saying that Slovak society is far from being united in its approach to the question of entry into NATO and that there are influential forces in the country that favor a different solution to the issues of national security. In any case, we proceed from the premise that only a sovereign state itself and its people have the right to decide on the issues of its foreign political orientation and of guaranteeing its security, and its choice, when it expresses it, has to be respected. Nevertheless, the citizens of Russia also have an equal right; they may express their concerns regarding the possible negative changes in the strategic situation in Europe in the event of NATO enlargement, concerns that we are also expressing at various levels in our dialogue with Bratislava. The fact that our concerns are taken very seriously in Slovakia and that it expresses itself in favor of taking Russia's interests into consideration unconditionally and also of Russia's participation in building a new system for European security cannot fail to make an impression on us. We also encounter such an attitude, realistic and pragmatic, in many West European capitals—for example, Paris, Bonn, and Rome—but in far from all of the capital cities of the Central European states. In short, to date, the discussion on the issue of entry into NATO has not had any influence on Russian-Slovak relations."

The same passage in MLADA FRONTA DNES:

"We are well aware that one of the goals of the Slovak Government's policy statement is entry into NATO. But we also know that the whole of society, and not only in Slovakia, is far from being in agreement with this goal. We know of influential forces here that have a different concept for the country's security. In any case, this is a matter for Slovakia's citizens, just as it is for the citizens of all of the countries in Central Europe. They have the right to decide. But the citizens of Russia also have a similar right to express their concerns about NATO expansion, and we very much appreciate the fact that Bratislava respects our concerns. We are also registering a similar approach in Western countries, but, unfortunately, not in Prague, Budapest, or Warsaw. From this point of view, Bratislava, to our pleasure, is really different."

Slovakia: Officials Doubt Russian Secret Service Activity

AU1302124096 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 10 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "I. Andrejcak Does Not Know That Russian Agents Would Operate in the Slovak Republic Against Our Entry Into NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Czech press published information recently on a top secret Czech Security Information Service report, according to which the Russian intelligence services allegedly are endeavoring to obtain and purposely interpret discriminating information on Czech Government representatives, the Defense and Interior Ministries, and the intelligence services, with which they will attempt to delay the Czech

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Republic's entry into NATO. We asked the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Defense and Security Committee, Imrich Andrejcak, if he has similar information about the Russian secret service's operations in Slovakia. He stated that the information is of a type intended to cause a certain psychosis and that he personally would not attach great importance to it. "If the Slovak authorities had evidence or a concrete suspicion to this effect, they would take a serious view of it," he said. On a general level, however, according to him, it is necessary to state that several foreign intelligence services are operating in the Slovak Republic and all of them have certain tasks. "While they are here, they can attempt anything, but you just try and prove that someone is a member of an intelligence service," added Andrejcak.

According to L. Pittner, former interior minister and Christian Democratic Movement deputy, it is hard to rule out the possibility that, from a professional point of view, foreign intelligence services would no longer have an interest in what is going on in Slovakia, but he does not think that they would interfere in our internal affairs.

"Rather, in connection with the Russian intelligence service, I believe that the Slovak Information Service under the leadership of I. Lexa is so vehemently acknowledging its cooperation with [illegible] service, the Russian secret service, that this is even inconvenient to it because it is not normal in democratic countries," he added.

Slovakia: Opposition's Pittner on 'Supervision' of SIS

AU1302204796 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ladislav Pittner, NR SR deputy for the Christian Democratic Movement and former Slovak interior minister, by Jana Pankovcinova in Bratislava; date not given: "'It Is High Time for the SIS Also To Come Under the Opposition's Supervision'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Former Interior Minister L. Pittner addressed an interpellation to Prime Minister V. Meciar yesterday in connection with the activity of the Slovak Information Service (SIS).

[Pankovcinova] You said that I. Lexa [SIS director] was supposed to have issued a directive that the secretariats of the opposition parties be bugged. Could you reveal the source of your information and whether the other opposition parties have also confirmed it?

[Pittner] The source from whom I received this information is directly within SIS. People from two different opposition party secretariats have also turned to me and said that, in view of certain circumstances, they feel that their discussions, telephone conversations, and so on in their secretariats have evidently been bugged somehow. I think that, following my interpellation, opposition parties affected in this way will also turn to the media with their experiences.

[Pankovcinova] But this would mean that the secret service is interfering illegally in political life. As an opposition deputy, what can you do against this when the opposition is not represented in the Special Supervisory Body (OKO) of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR]?

[Pittner] Because the opposition is not represented in OKO, I am left with no choice but to turn to the prime minister. He, as chairman of the State Defense Council, should set the tasks of SIS in writing. He presides over the government. It approves SIS's statute, in which the organization of SIS is also discussed.

I believe that, also in view of the comments from abroad, it is high time for SIS to come under the opposition's supervision, too. Until this is the case, SIS will be under suspicion, and, as long as we receive such information from within it, we will have no possibility of verifying it other than by an interpellation in the NR SR.

[Pankovcinova] Some time ago, you addressed an unsuccessful interpellation to the prime minister when you pointed to the renewal of the network of StB [State Security] operatives. It may also happen now that the prime minister will not answer you. What next?

[Pittner] This situation is already unsustainable, and, if the prime minister were to do this, it would be politically intolerable for the coalition for this situation to persist. It is evident that the opposition is not represented in OKO.

[Pankovcinova] You claim that a section should be set up within SIS counterintelligence to monitor the activity of the churches. Can you explain this? Is it somehow connected with the affair of the Bishop's Office?

[Pittner] If such a section were to be established—and my information from within SIS is that it has been established or, rather, that it is being established and also supplemented by the former network of StB operatives—there will be more of these cases, as in the past. The first suspicion was expressed by the Franciscan deacon J. Balasz, who spoke about his experiences before he delivered his sermon [on 21 January on political interference in church affairs]. As far as the affair surrounding the Adoration of the Three Kings triptych is concerned, it is remarkable that the person

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involved—allegedly a Swiss buyer—has not, according to findings that were also in the media, been identified in Switzerland. There is a suspicion here that the operation was a SIS intelligence game.

Slovakia: No Proof, but Opposition Feels Offices 'Bugged'

AU1302210196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 10 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "(sp)": "Because Former StB Operatives Are Becoming Active in SIS, the Opposition Has No Confidence in It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Highly placed former StB [State Security] operatives are becoming active in the Slovak Information Service (SIS), and, therefore, we have no confidence in it. The opposition is excluded from the Special Supervisory Body (OKO) of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] so there is no chance for it to supervise SIS. Because we are aware of SIS practices under its current leadership, I am not ruling out the possibility that our secretariat is being bugged or kept under surveillance. We are taking the necessary steps in accordance with this," said Democratic Union [DU] Chairman J. Moravcik in reply to a question on whether DU has information suggesting that its secretariat is being bugged. L. Pittner, a Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] deputy in the NR SR, addressed an interpellation to Prime Minister V. Meciar on 8 February 1996 on the possible bugging of the opposition parties' secretariats by the means SIS has at its disposal. According to KDH Chairman J. Carnogursky, L. Pittner obtained this information from circles close to SIS, and "his information is, understandably, also the KDH's information." "Admittedly, we do not have proof, but we think something is not right. There have been cases in which someone was looking for our coalition partners from Egyutteles, but the telephone rang in our office," said G. Bardos, a Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement deputy in the NR SR, to SME. Egyutteles Chairman M. Duray told us that they have no direct proof. "We have ascertained, however, that reports discussed within the central office are being mentioned in circles they cannot reach." The Social Democratic Party in Slovakia secretariat has no information on bugging. According to the party's deputy chairman, M. Spejl, however, it would be good to know about the covert participant in the telephone conversations. Similarly, Democratic Party Chairman J. Langos has no provable information at his disposal that the party's secretariat is being bugged.

Slovakia: Hungarian Parties Want To Meet Meciar

LD1302231396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian coalition will ask Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in a letter on Friday, 16 February, to meet top representatives of three political groups—the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH], Coexistence, and the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS].

According to information given to TASR [Slovak news agency] by MKDH spokesman Deputy Gyula Bardos, this decision was made in Bratislava today by the Hungarian coalition council.

Its members have also agreed on the draft of the law on the territorial and administrative setup of the Republic, in which these three political groups intend to push forward the division of Slovak territory into 16 regions [zupa].

They have also approved the decision of a group of deputies to do research into whether the Law on State Language is in line with the Constitution.

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Hungary: Arms Supplies Behind Moscow's NATO Stance

AU1402125596 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Laszlo M. Lengyel: "Moscow's Hungarian Weapons' Market"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The times of cautious messages and "conveying" opinions are over. Andrey Kokoshin, the first deputy of the Russian defense minister, made clear and systematized the fact that Moscow is consistently opposing the NATO expansion. Kokoshin also included this fact in the Russian system of views regarding the pan-European processes.

Among the mostly well-known arguments, there is a surprisingly clear statement according to which, among many other things, Moscow is anxious about its armament markets in East-Central Europe. NEPSZABADSAG asked the opinion of experts about this—experts who preferred to remain anonymous.

In 1993, the Hungarian army spent a total of 2,943,314,000 forints [Ft] on technical supplies (weapons, spare parts, machines, installations, transport vehicles, and the technical requirements of the stationing service), or 3.8 percent of the overall Defense Ministry budget for 1993. In 1994, this expense stood at Ft3,634,768,000 (4.5 percent); in 1995, however, only Ft421,520,000 (0.6 percent) were spent on this. The final figures for this year are expected to come out in March or April. These figures do not contain the value of the MiG-29 combat aircraft supplied to the Hungarian army as part of the Russian state debt deriving from bilateral trade or the $240 million that the Hungarian Army will hopefully spend on purchasing spare parts and installations from Moscow.

It transpires from these figures that, no matter how difficult the Russian military industry situation is, Hungary is not a market that, if lost as a result of a possible NATO membership, would represent a considerable disadvantage for Moscow. At the same time, it is a fact that practically all the tanks, artillery pieces, radar systems, telecommunications, armored vehicles, and trucks of the Hungarian army originate from the former Soviet Union (Russia or Ukraine today). The Hungarian military industry only manufactured some personal arms, transport vehicles, and electronic equipment.

Thus, what Moscow is really concerned about is not so much the market, but the dependence on the supply of spare parts. Easing this from the Hungarian side is not only primarily a political need, but also an economic one, given the fact that it was precisely the collapse of the "sound Eastern military technology market" that led to the bankruptcy of the military departments of Videoton and partly of the Firearm and Gas Equipment Factory, as well as the military departments of other firms.

The new bloc logic behind Moscow's concern appears in the arguments regarding the implementation of the treaty on the reduction of arms and armed forces in Central Europe. The fact that Moscow would like to regroup the original Warsaw Pact limits to its side shows that Moscow does not want to weaken the Russian Army on two flanks that are particularly sensitive: in the northern Caucasus and in the Leningrad Military District, primarily at Pskov. The United States and NATO are ready to negotiate on this, but not to the detriment of the Baltic states and Turkey, and definitely not in a way that would strengthen any kind of bloc logic. In addition, the issue here is Moscow's own internal geopolitical consideration, rather than pan-European security considerations.

Hungary: Officials on 'Will' To Conclude Basic Treaty

LD1302204896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Both the Hungarian and the Romanian sides have the political will to finalize the basic treaty. This was said by Ferenc Somogyi, administrative state secretary at the Foreign Ministry, and his Romanian negotiating partners. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest.

[Bogdan] Following the talks, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu stressed, first and foremost, that on this occasion the Romanian side had very clearly expressed that it had the political will and the necessary political support for the signing of the basic treaty.

At his news briefing held jointly with Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state, he also said that now it seemed the signing of the basic treaty had a pressing deadline, for [Romanian President] Ion Iliescu and Gyula Horn in Madrid considered it possible to hold another meeting in March. On that occasion, the document may even be signed, he added.

Speaking to the press, Ferenc Somogyi said that, at his meeting held with State Secretary Marcel Dinu this morning, they managed to clear up and to explain several general questions and certain problems raised after the exchange of reconciliation documents.

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Hungary: UDMR Deputy on Romanian Basic Treaty Picks

AU1302162496 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by unidentified correspondent on interview with UDMR deputy Jeno Matis; place and date not given: "In the Magic Circle of Basic Treaties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian politicians and high-ranking government officials declared recently that Ukraine is Romania's most important neighbor.

Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu also said this in one of his recent statements, making it clear that Romania finds it more important to have a basic treaty with Ukraine than with Hungary. Many people are wondering whether there can be a reorganization of the list of basic treaties according to importance, or whether there can be some change in Bucharest's strategy in the process of finalizing the planned basic treaties with its neighbors, especially in Romanian-Hungarian relations. Jeno Matis, political scientist and deputy of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] in the Romanian Parliament, answered these questions in his interview to UJ MAGYARORSZAG.

Given its geographic size, economic potential, and its role in East-Central Europe, as well as for security policy and military reasons, Ukraine is Romania's most important neighbor. However, there is not even a draft Romanian-Ukrainian basic treaty in existence, and it is far from being in a stage that would make it more important than the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty. There have been two Romanian-Ukrainian meetings at the level of foreign ministry experts so far, and the argument on the Serpent Island emerged after the second meeting. However, this is not the issue that hinders the Ukrainian-Romanian basic treaty—Jeno Matis told us.

There is a community of ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine. The former government-ally Greater Romania Party, Funar's party (the current ally) and even some opposition forces have been saying more or less openly that the issue of the Northern Bukovina and Herta District should be settled. But the Romanian foreign policy uses double standards on the minority issue. They demand community rights, education in mother tongue on all levels, bilingual signposts, and the use of mother tongue for the ethnic Romanians living outside Romania; at the same time, Romania rejects similar demands coming from Hungary or the RMDSZ by saying that this is Romania's internal affair. This principle represents a trap for Romania, and not for Ukraine. The minority policy is more developed in Ukraine. However, it is strange that the two Ukrainian-Romanian foreign ministerial meetings did not discuss the possibility of having the national minority issue mentioned as a separate article in the basic principles of the basic treaty.

The way I see it—Jeno Matis told us—there is not, and there will not be a strategy change in the Romanian foreign policy, a strategy change according to which Romania would develop its relations with Ukraine, Slovakia, and Serbia in a way to create a possible anti-Hungarian system of relations or to exercise pressure on Hungary this way. Of course, one can see clearly that the official political leaders of Romania and Slovakia coordinate their national minority policy quite frequently, and they take quite similar steps. Moreover, at the various bilateral meetings, they openly declared that the leaders of both countries have a similar view about the patterns and examples to be followed regarding the relations between the political leadership of the respective country and the ethnic Hungarians living there. Romania will take steps to sign a basic treaty with Serbia soon, and Romania wants to actively participate in reconstruction works there too. It is worth noticing that Romania does not have a basic treaty with Bulgaria either and, so far, the two states have been unable to agree on the location of a new bridge over the Danube River....

There is an integration competition between Romania and Hungary: NATO integration is a major interest for both countries. Hungary is leading with several rounds in this competition. However, one country cannot exercise pressure on the other one here.

According to Jeno Matis, there will be no Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty at all before the general elections in Romania scheduled for the fall of 1996. The way the Romanian politics treated the issue of a Romanian-Hungarian or a Romanian-Ukrainian basic treaty does not show any concrete changes in the Romanian positions regarded as tough. The Romanian Foreign Ministry will not be willing to accept the EU Resolution No. 1,201 in the basic treaty even after the interpretation decision.

Hungary: Kuncze Views Coalition Arguments, SZDSZ

AU1302214496 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 10 Feb 96 p 7

[Interview with Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze, deputy coalition prime minister, by Hajnalka Cseke; place and date not given: "Is the Government Conducting Success Propaganda?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Cseke] The prime minister and several ministers repeatedly declared in recent

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weeks that the 1995 activity of the cabinet was successful. The macro-level economic indicators have indeed improved but, according to some experts, this is due to the customs supplements and surplus income from privatization, rather than the Bokros-package. Do you think that the government is conducting success propaganda?

[Kuncze] I do not regard this as success propaganda. The government's economic policy in 1995 can indeed be regarded as successful. We reduced the deficit in the foreign balance of payments considerably; the same applies to the budget deficit and, contrary to all the preliminary evaluations, inflation remained within the planned limits. The number of jobs increased and economic growth did not stop in the meantime. Thus, the government took control of the problems that, as a consequence of the economic policy of previous years, drifted Hungary to the brink of collapse in 1994. We cannot speak of success propaganda here also because the government admits that the population had to make sacrifices for these results. [passage omitted]

[Cseke] There have been no coalition debates lately. Does this mean that things are in order, or is this silence some kind of "tactic" on the part of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]?

[Kuncze] When coalition arguments emerge, everyone presumes that the SZDSZ tactic is to argue. If there are no open arguments, people presume that the SZDSZ tactic is to refrain from arguing. Things are different in reality. The issues that led to debates before are now settled, and issues that might lead to new debates are not on the agenda. Besides, governing parties are arguing with each other everywhere, and neighboring Austria is a good example. This is natural, because there can be issues that we judge differently.

[Cseke] The Coalition Coordination Council [KET] has not been convened for a long time. On what forums are the SZDSZ politicians talking to politicians of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] now? How do they clarify their differences of views?

[Kuncze] The original function of the KET was to deal with the possible conflicts and to mediate between the two parties on serious political issues. There has not been any conflict situation lately, so we did not have to convene the KET. [passage omitted]

[Cseke] How does the SZDSZ take it that its popularity has dropped and the Independent Smallholders' Party is now heading the popularity list?

[Kuncze] I think it is natural that support for the SZDSZ has dropped in the wake of accepting government responsibility. This is inevitable. [passage omitted]

Hungary: MSZP Social Democrats Assess Party Issues

AU1302194096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 Feb 96 p 4

[Report by Tamas Rozsa: "Vitanyi: The MSZP Is in Trouble"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] cannot get away with not doing a self-assessment. This should be done as soon as possible but will not yet be feasible at the March congress, Ivan Vitanyi, chairman of the party's national committee, said at a conference of the Association for Social Democratic Values platform.

"The party is in trouble. We have not managed to recruit new members since 1990, and the occasional voters—mainly people living on wages and salaries—are now turning away from us," Vitanyi said at the platform's 10 February meeting. According to Vitanyi, the current executive committee has not had a chance to participate in decisionmaking. People who can represent the membership's opinion against the government should be elected into the executive committee. "It is not good if the party is only an appendix to the government," he said.

According to Miklos Horn, general deputy chairman of the national committee, 1995 cannot be seen as a turning point, the positive results are only due to temporary resources. The government cannot continue to bring unconsidered and improvised measures and to use these as substitutes for overall reforms.

A number of contributors said that, in addition to Gyula Horn, other person or persons should also be nominated for party chairman at the congress. In connection with this, Magda Kovac's, Mrs. Kosa's, and Bela Katona's names were mentioned. According to one opinion, this has to be done even if the prime minister resigns as a result because the positions of prime minister and party chairman will be separated.

According to Vitany's opinion, a new prime minister-party chairman would not be able to get real legitimation. The government has made many mistakes but it is progressing on the right path, and this is also positively appreciated in the West. He emphasized that the MSZP will not be able to escape self-examination. It should be done as soon as possible.

A number of participants criticized parliamentary group leader Imre Szekeres's statement in which he held out the prospect of the Socialist deputy group refusing to participate in the voting on the agent law. In their view,

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the parliamentary group of a governing party cannot do this.

According to a proposal of the social democratic platform, the size of the executive committee and the national committee has to be reduced. The membership of the executive committee must not be determined either on a regional or a misconstrued professional basis. It is necessary to elect an executive chairman or a general deputy chairman who organizes the party's life. Only two instead of the current four deputy chairmen are needed.

Hungary: Horn Supports Idea of 'Smaller Parliament'

LD1302221596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Prime Minister Gyula Horn is of the view that a smaller parliament is needed. Gyoergyi Nemeth reports on his news conference at the National Association of Hungarian journalists.

[Nemeth] [passage omitted] According to the prime minister, it is possible that the electoral law will be amended before the 1998 parliamentary elections, because a parliament of 180-200 members would be sufficient.

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B-H: IFOR: Serb Boycott 'Serious Violation' of Accord

AU1402124696 Paris AFP in English 1151 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 14 (AFP) — The Bosnian Serb army's boycott of contacts with NATO's peace force in Bosnia is a "serious violation" of the Dayton peace agreement, IFOR [Implementation Force] officials said Wednesday [14 February].

"The last official contact with the VRS (Bosnian Serb army) was midday last Thursday. This unilateral boycott of communications by the VRS constitutes a serious violation of the Dayton peace agreement," IFOR spokesman Major Mark Rayner told reporters.

The break in top-level contacts between the Serb military and IFOR chiefs was sparked by the arrest of two senior Serb army officers by the Bosnian Government authorities last month.

Their transfer to the Netherlands by a U.S. NATO plane on Monday for further investigation by the Hague-based war crimes tribunal has further deepened resentment in the Serb camp.

All but "emergency communications" have been cut off at the highest level of command, Rayner said, adding that the IFOR command is "concerned that the situation does not worsen."

General Sir Michael Walker, the commander in charge of the NATO-led IFOR peacekeepers, had been engaged "in a serious and intense effort" since the beginning of the boycott "to persuade the VRS at all levels to resume a dialogue," Rayner stated.

Lower-level contact between the Bosnian Serb military and IFOR "remained constant," the spokesman said. He added: "In coordination with other commands and international organisations, IFOR is urging the VRS to return to the table and resume the dialogue which must happen for the Dayton agreement to succeed."

The U.S.-brokered Dayton accords were signed last December by the Bosnian Government, and the presidents of neighbouring Croatia and Serbia. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who is held largely responsible for fomenting the war in Bosnia, signed the agreement on behalf of his Bosnian Serb brethren.

B-H: Serb Foreign Minister Lists Accord Violations

LD1302185096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 13 Feb (SRNA) — In connection with the handing over of two senior Serb officers to the Hague tribunal, Professor Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, today sent an open letter, on behalf of the government, to Carl Bildt [international civilian coordinator for Bosnia], representatives of contact group countries, and representatives of the member countries of the administrative committee of the conference for the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

"The government of the Serb Republic considers that it has an urgent duty to warn you of a series of negative elements in the implementation so far of the peace agreement; it is vital to overcome these as soon as possible lest the agreement is repudiated," the Serb foreign minister writes, and he lists examples of the violation of the agreement:

"1. A satisfactory solution has not yet been found to ensure the collective and civil rights of Serbs in Serb Sarajevo. This problem will intensify as 19 March, the final date envisaged for the handover of Serb Sarajevo to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, approaches.

"2. International factors have done nothing to release General Djukic and his colleagues from a Muslim prison. On the contrary, by doing nothing they have condoned the impermissible hunt for Serbs and accepted the subsequently trumped up Muslim charges. Finally, they collaborated in the baseless abduction of Gen. Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic to The Hague.

"3. Although the deadline for the release of all POW's has long since passed, several hundred Serbs are still being held in prisons in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Republic of Croatia. The UNHCR, for example, two days ago counted 88 Serb POW's in Tuzla. The government of the Serb Republic believes the international community could, if it wanted, force these sides to fulfill their obligations in accordance with the Dayton agreement immediately.

"4. Although the Serb Republic has met all conditions envisaged in Resolution 222, the sanctions against the Serb Republic have not yet been lifted. It is as if the Security Council cannot reconcile itself to the positive developments, and is hesitating and waiting for new 'reasons' to keep the sanctions in place."

Minister Buha claims these are only the most striking examples of "the inconsistent behavior of the international players toward the Serb Republic."

"Each of these separately is sufficient to make us worry about the fate of the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was achieved with so many difficulties. Taken together, these examples confirm that unprincipled policies can lead us into a new tragedy. I appeal to you to do everything to avoid this tragedy," Minister Buha concludes in his letter, which was also forwarded to SRNA.

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B-H: Serb Official Discusses Arrests With EU Envoy

LD1302153496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 13 Feb (SRNA) — The arrest of Serb officers Djordje Djukic and Aleksa Krsmanovic, and of the the Muslim photographer Hidajet Delic, was the main topic of talks with EU envoy Robert Frowick, Serb Information Minister Dragan Bozanic said.

"Photographer Delic was arrested under the suspicion that he had witnessed war crimes and possessed ham radio equipment," Bozanic said.

Bozanic added: "The investigation will be fair and if innocent, Delic will be released. However, the current problem and the one that affects the further implementation of the Dayton agreement is the unprecedented kidnapping of our officers by Muslim authorities. So far we have been trying to secure the release of the prisoners of war and now we have a more dangerous situation — the prisoners of peace. At the time when we should be consolidating peace we are facing a strange situation that could only be described as a manhunt."

According to Bozanic, "IFOR's behavior resembles NATO's behavior, of which we do not have fond memories." He said that "IFOR provided direct support during the extradition of the officers to The Hague and it will be difficult to restore trust."

Frowick promised that he would try to discuss the current situation with certain circles in order to prevent it from deteriorating further, Bozanic said.

When asked by SRNA to comment on the extradition of the Serb officers to The Hague, Bozanic warned: "In my opinion it is the greatest scandal we have faced since the beginning of the war. The people accused of alleged war crimes on paper only, were not only arrested but were taken away to Holland where they could be sentenced. This would be without precedent in international law and international relations. I hope that they will be released as innocent and patriotic officers who have only done their job during a difficult civil and religious war."

"The international community and Carl Bildt must do everything to regain the people's trust, if the peace process, which is now facing a great obstacle, is to be resumed," Bozanic said in conclusion.

B-H: Plavsic Optimistic on Extradited Officers' Release

LD1302162896 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Republic Vice President Biljana Plavsic has expressed optimism regarding the resolution of the most serious crisis since the Dayton agreement was signed. This is how she explained the extradition of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic to The Hague:

[Begin Plavsic recording] I believe that pressure was exerted and in that sense I believe that it is good that they were extricated from the Muslim prison even if they were taken to The Hague. No one knows whether they have been taken to The Hague or somewhere else, but now there is a better chance that they will be released and that they will arrive in our territory than when they were in the Muslim prison. This is my optimistic assessment of the situation.

However, if they are in The Hague I really do not know how charges can be brought against them on no grounds whatsoever. In this case I am sure that there is no single reason. [end recording]

B-H: Hague: Serb Suspects 'Could Wait Weeks' for Decision

AU1302165596 Paris AFP in English 1631 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Feb 13 (AFP) — Two Bosnian Serb war-crimes suspects could wait weeks before being charged and will be sent back to Sarajevo as witnesses if the UN war-crimes tribunal does not prosecute them, a spokesman said Tuesday [13 February].

Christian Chartier, spokesman for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICT), said that if the tribunal failed to lay charges against the men they would be "handed back to the Bosnian authorities."

It was the arrest January 30 of General Djorje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic by Bosnian government police which sparked a major crisis in the Bosnian peace process.

Noting that the two men had "not yet been charged, and are only suspects," Chartier said that even if charges were eventually filed against the Serbs, they would take several weeks to draw up.

However, he refused to rule out the possibility that neither Djukic nor Krsmanovic would face prosecution.

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Should the tribunal send the men back to Sarajevo, the Bosnian government would be obliged to make them available to UN investigators if it needed to interview them at a later date on other war-crimes cases, Chartier added.

Dominique Marro, the clerk to the UN war-crimes tribunal, was expected to visit the pair Tuesday evening in their cells at Scheveningen, near here, following their dramatic transferal from a government jail in Sarajevo late Monday.

The pair, the top two logistics officers for the Bosnian Serb army during the Bosnian war, are accused by the Sarajevo authorities of a range of offences under international war-crimes legislation.

B-H: Serb Liberal Party Leader Condemns Extradition

LD1302174596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 Feb (SRNA) — Kosta Cavoski, president of the main committee of the Serb Liberal Party [SLS], described the extradition of the senior [Bosnian] Serb officers to The Hague tribunal as "an act of total lawlessness and an unprecedented scandal."

"In the case of the Americans, the English, and the French, legal standards exist for their domestic consumption alone; outside their own countries and in the Balkans, it is the law of force and the right of the mighty that applies," Cavoski said.

According to him, the way in which General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic were arrested and then transferred to The Hague, "does not comply with legal conduct."

In a statement for SRNA, Cavoski said that "the officers have not been told what the charges are and have not been given an opportunity to defend themselves."

"It seems that it does not matter whether the correct offenders are captured or not. The aim is rather to capture one or two eminent Serb officers or politicians to try them and to put the blame on the Serb state and the Serb nation," he said.

B-H: Pale Serbs Oppose Transfer of Suspects to Hague

AU1302175696 Paris AFP in English 1718 GMT 13 Feb 96

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 13 (AFP) — The transfer of two senior Bosnian Serb officers to The Hague to face possible war crimes charges has only deepened a sense of suspicion and anger among rebel Serbs in Sarajevo.

Far from restoring faith in international justice, the transfer of the Serb general and his deputy to a prison reserved for war crimes suspects has only confirmed the Serbs' worst fears.

"It is clear now. Every Serb is guilty for the Moslem government and unfortunately for The Hague also," said Drazen, a Bosnian Serb former soldier living in the rebel-held Sarajevo district of Grbavica.

Members of the Bosnian Serb top brass, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic were whisked from a government prison in Sarajevo to a waiting NATO plane and flown to the Netherlands late Monday. [passage omitted]

But for Vanja, a Serb journalist drinking coffee in a smoky Grbavica cafe, Djukic is a "good man." Not only "because he fought for the Serb people but he always protected Moslems in prison. I know him personally," he adds.

Ironically though, Vanja thinks the transfer is a good thing "because now our nation lost its illusions about IFOR (the NATO-led Implementation Force) and about the U.S. politics and lost their good impression of the European Union. Finally this is proof of who is the aggressor."

The Bosnian Serbs broke off contacts with the Moslem-Croat federation and cooled relations with IFOR in protest at the detentions, the first serious obstacle to the delicate peace process. [passage omitted]

NATO's involvement was also the closest the Atlantic alliance has come to the detention of war crimes suspects. Under the Dayton accord, IFOR has the "authority but not the obligation" to arrest anyone indicted by the tribunal.

But the apparent ease with which the men were plucked from the country shocked Vanja and Drazen. "If somebody is a war criminal you should know everything about him first. Then it is okay to capture him and put him in prison but this is something else. This is a shame for the world," Drazen said.

Hopes of NATO capturing bigger fish such as the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic, the military chief, both indicted war criminals, should be forgotten, the two young men said.

"Anyone who tried to arrest Karadzic will be destroyed," vowed Vanja. "They cannot do that. They can only try but they will only lose lives." [passage omitted]

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B-H: Kasagic: Arrest of Serb Officers Threatens Peace

LD1202180696 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 12 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a report just received from Podgorica, Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, said, after his meeting with Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community, in Podgorica that implementation of the Dayton Agreement was proceeding well until the authorities of the Muslim-Croat Federation arrested two senior Serb officers. This was the last straw, Prime Minister Kasagic said, and went on to note that the Croat-Muslim Federation had failed to fulfill even those provisions of the Dayton Agreement that called for the release of POW's.

He said that the Muslim authorities are behaving arrogantly and cited as an example a recent statement by the Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic, to the effect that he will not release the captured Serb officers, Lieutenant-Colonel-General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, even at the price of endangering peace. This statement, as I told Mr. Bildt today, is covered by the Hague tribunal [as heard], Kasagic said. He said he is amazed that the ad hoc war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia will try 63-year-old Gen. Djukic, who was in charge of humanitarian issues and logistics.

The Serb Republic prime minister said that mutual trust will disappear unless the current wave of arrests stops soon. He said that as part of its support for a peaceful solution, the Serb side is nevertheless continuing consistently to implement all the provisions of the Dayton agreement on former Bosnia.

The high representative of the international community described his talks today with the Serb Republic prime minister as successful despite, as he put it, certain problems that emerged in the peace process. These problems can be tackled in two ways: either by respecting the Dayton agreement as a whole or by resuming the dialogue between all sides, the Swedish diplomat said.

Speaking about the fate of the captured Serb officers, Bildt said that it is now up to the international tribunal to make a decision and went on to express his firm belief that the problem will be resolved very soon.

As announced, Rajko Kasagic will today be received separately by Momir Bulatovic an Milo Djukanovic, president and prime minister of Montenegro, respectively.

B-H: Serb Opposition Blames Milosevic for Extradition

LD1302181996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1617 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 13 Feb (SRNA) — The National League Party [Saborna Narodna Stranka—SNS, Serbian opposition party] claims that the extradition of [Bosnian] Serb army officers to the Hague tribunal was signed by the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.

According to a statement issued by the party, "Milosevic's approval of their extradition means that our prediction — that his appointment for the head of the negotiating team [in Dayton] was an unfortunate solution for the Serb nation — is becoming true."

According to the same source, "other tragic surprises can be expected" because the Serbian president "protects his own ideological misconception, but not his people."

Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman of the Serb Renewal Movement [Srpski Pokret Obnove—SPO, Serbian opposition party], said that the answer to the question about the deportation of the high-ranking Serb army officers to The Hague should be sought "from the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic."

He expressed the hope that "the Serbian president and the ruling Socialist Party would reply to this question soon and inform the public, because negotiators are always immune from arrest." [passage omitted]

B-H: Media 'Concealing' Truth on Serb Officers' Arrest

LD1302194396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1847 GMT 13 Feb 96

[By Dragan Milosavljevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 13 (TANJUG) — The media campaign surrounding the handing over of Serb Republic army officers to The Hague Tribunal is once again aimed at concealing the truth according to a well-rehearsed scenario of confusing causes with effects, covering up for one side and demonizing the side which is always condemned in advance.

Instead of focusing the attention of the world public opinion on yet another attempt to undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement — as leading world analysts have described the arbitration in the Muslim-Croat conflict over the divided city of Mostar — western news agencies, radio stations and television networks are competing in trying to predict the fate of the arrested Serb officers, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic.

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The media from countries well aware that the principle of a suspect being presumed innocent until proven guilty forms the basis of legal system and democracy, are in their campaign systematically ignoring the circumstances under which the Serb officers were kidnapped in a zone under IFOR [Implementation Force] control.

The kidnapping of the Serb officers by Muslims on January 30 [word indistinct] IFOR's eyes was described as manhunt by some commentators, and the tribunal's subsequent steps were designed later to fit.

Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, described by renowned U.S. Commentator David Binder as a man who sees himself as the conscience of the entire humanity, has thus redirected the attention of the world public opinion from the time bomb ticking away in Mostar to himself and the tribunal.

The attack last week on E.U. Administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnick by Croat demonstrators dissatisfied with his decision on the future organization of the city, and Croatia's open siding with those who reject the Dayton formula for coexistence in Mostar, might destroy all illusions of lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to assessments that have (on purpose) not received front page coverage.

Why so much publicitiy was given to the 'transfer' of Serb officers to The Hague while hiding the truth that they had been kidnapped and that the peace process was thus seriously endangered, is probably known best to political power centers behind the scenes.

B-H: Karadzic Terms Extradition of Serb Officers 'Scandal'

LD1302225996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2159 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 13 Feb (SRNA) — Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said this evening in Pale that the handing over of high-ranking Serb officers to The Hague court investigating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia is "yet another international scandal."

"I believe that this has impinged in a most serious way on the freedom of movement. Our common life together will not be possible as long as the international community continues to condone Muslim provocations and as long as they hate the Serb Republic," Dr. Karadzic told SRNA at the end of an extended session of the republic's Chamber of Commerce.

Commenting on reports that Lieutenant Colonel General Djordje Djukic and Col. Aleksa Krsmanovic will be detained in Muslim Sarajevo as witnesses if their guilt is not proved, the president of the Serb Republic said: "Where is it that witnesses are arrested and held in prison? If this happens, it makes a mockery of the law and of justice."

Asked by SRNA's correspondent how the Serb Republic leadership would react to the handing over of the two officers to the Hague tribunal, Dr. Karadzic said that the Serb Republic had maintained relations with the Implementation Force, but that it had deferred all contacts with the Croat-Muslim federation until further notice, not wishing to break them off completely and forever, as he put it.

"The dignity of the Serb nation does not allow us on the one hand to hold constructive negotiations on the supposition that hostilities have ceased, while on the other hand these [hostilities] resume in the form of the arrest of top Serb officers," the Serb Republic president said.

"If the war has not ended, we want to be told loudly and clearly," Dr. Karadzic concluded.

B-H: Serb Speaker Krajisnik on Accord, Officers' Arrest

LD1302235896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 13 Feb (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serb Republic parliament, said the implementation of the Dayton agreement had been accepted, even though the maps and changes to the peace part of the plan were not acceptable to the Serb side.

[Words indistinct] those who obstruct the Dayton agreement," said Krajisnik, and stressed that it was necessary for the Serb people to overcome as soon as possible the fear of war and to begin to live in conditions of peace.

According to the speaker of the People's Assembly, the attitude of the Serb people and leadership towards the international peace forces had always been correct but, as he stressed, "they thought the Serbs would need to be monitored, and that is what they have constantly done from the outset."

"IFOR [Implementation Force] was able to see for itself who is obstructing the Dayton agreement when, after the decision of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, to release all prisoners, the Muslim side has still not done so," Krajisnik said, and added that he personally had been against the decision.

According to him, the Muslims were first to obstruct the Dayton agreement on this issue, and on the issue of freedom of movement, when they arrested 11 Serb

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officers and soldiers as they were travelling on a "blue route" controlled by IFOR.

Commenting on the arrest of General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, Krajisnik said that the Serb Republic had to suspend relations with the Muslims, adding:

"No one can be allowed to arrest Serb officers, while IFOR does nothing. The representatives of the multinational forces are putting their credibility on the line."

In a statement to Bosnian Serb Television the parliamentary speaker said the leadership of the Serb Republic was pressing the issue of Serb Sarajevo at all talks because, as he said, "Sarajevo is a major problem. We have still not provided for those people who fled earlier, and now we are getting more."

B-H: Izetbegovic, Tudjman Discuss Mostar, Federation

AU1402120396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, last night had a telephone conversation with Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, and afterwards met Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic. While the direct reason for these talks was the situation in Mostar, they did include some other issues in connection with the implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Tudjman reiterated Croatia's firm support for the project of the Federation and proposed that the two sides enter a dialogue with a view to resolving outstanding issues.

President Izetbegovic accepted this proposal in principle, being of the opinion that mutual accusations through the media do not solve anything but only complicate the situation. In that connection, President Izetbegovic is of the following opinion: If there should be talks, they should encompass all issues of the Federation, including above all freedom of movement, of religious and political activity, the return of refugees, and the establishment of federal police and customs offices on the borders.

Where Mostar is concerned, the talks can be held only at the initiative and under the leadership of EU Administrator Hans Koschnick and may only concern the modalities of implementation of Koschnick's plan. Under these conditions, the talks should open immediately and it would be useful if, apart from the leaders of the Federation, they included one representative of the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina Government each, as well as possibly the representative of the European Union and the United States. This was announced by President Izetbegovic's office.

B-H: Croatian Ambassador Views Ties, Federation

AU1402124796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 96 p 4

[Interview with Darinko Bago, Croatian ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Drazen Curic; place and date not given: "Demarcation Is Still a Question of Negotiation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Both because of the fact that the Croats are one of the constituent nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and because there is a large interdependence of the military and political circumstances in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Embassy in Sarajevo certainly represents the most important Croatian diplomatic and consular representative body. That was one of the more important reasons for our interview with Darinko Bago, the recently appointed Croatian ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the direct reason for it was his assumption of his new post.

[Curic] What is your appraisal of the relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment?

[Bago] The relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are manifold, especially because there are two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina — the "Serb Republic" and the Federation. Relations with the "Serb Republic," except for humanitarian contacts, practically do not exist. On the other hand, the relations between Croatia and the Federation have been passing through the phase of the Dayton coordination.

[Curic] What is the development of that coordination?

[Bago] The Dayton agreements are significant because they have defined a couple of essential things. First of all, the existence of the three constituent nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their mutual relationship. Of course, after the conflict, it is not easy to apply everything that was agreed upon in Dayton. Therefore, a whole series of meetings and coordination is needed. There are also some people who do not want to accept the Dayton agreements. However, the results so far have proved that these people only represent a minority. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not important only for the Croats and Bosniak-Muslims in Bosnia, but also for Croatia, as well as for the international community, and that pprovides its perspective.

The Further We Go, The More Questions Arise

[Curic] Mostar is the most critical place. What is the Croatian view of the present situation, that is, to what

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degree has Koschnick's proposal been harmonized with the Croat stands?

[Bago] It is natural that the largest number of questions arose where the coordination had advanced most. Mostar is a town administrated by the European Union, and one tries to establish a balance of interests there. In such circumstances each side can hardly realise all of its interests. There are, meanwhile, prospects of achieving an agreement that would satisfy both sides. The EU proposal is, basically, acceptable to the Croat side.

[Curic] Some observers claim that the process is slowing down because the authorities of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Government of the Federation have not been clearly defined.

[Bago] The Dayton agreement has defined the authorities pretty accurately. However, applying those agreements is not simple. Only a couple of days ago, in line with the Dayton agreements, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was appointed, as well as the new prime minister-designate of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those were the preconditions for speeding up the process of the animation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the preconditions for the normalization of relations.

[Curic] The boundaries of the cantons were defined before the liberation of considerable parts of the Federation. What progress has there been in the negotiations on the final cantonal demarcation?

[Bago] The question of the demarcation has not been completely solved yet. That is still a question of negotiations, but the principled stand of Croatia is that the cantonal division should protect the existence of the Croatian nation in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When the War Is Over, There Will Be Visits

[Curic] What is Croatia's stand toward the "Serb Republic"? In that context, what does the visit of a Croatian delegation to Banja Luka mean?

[Bago] First of all, Mr. Slobodan Lang is a humanitarian worker, and each of his actions, including this visit, should be viewes in that context. The main goal of that visit was to solve humanitarian problems, primarily the liberation of the Croats detained in the "Serb Republic." Of course, this visit also had its political meaning, which was obvious from the reactions of the media in the "Serb Republic" and Serbia. One day, when the war is over, there will certainly be mutual visits, as well as more intensive economic and every other kind of cooperation.

[Curic] What do you think about the effects achieved by IFOR [Implementation Force]?

[Bago] We can certainly appraise the results of IFOR so far as positive. Croatia has saluted their arrival, and President Tudjman was one of the initiators of the involvement of the NATO forces, which make up the skeleton of IFOR in this territory. NATO is a respectable force and one expects that it will fully accomplish its task. Croatia, as well as the international community, is particularly interested in its role in the strengthening of the Federation.

[Curic] Before the Dayton agreements, people often mentioned the confederation of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, one mostly mentions the Presidential Council, and no confederation. In your opinion, what relations between the two states would be the best?

[Bago] The terms federation and confederation are often mentioned in public without being properly defined. In any case, Croatia accepts the basic principle for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is the protection of the Croat interests, both in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Federation. The Dayton agreements grant the existence of the Croat body in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is in the interests of Croatia to have good political, cultural, and particularly economic relations with the Federation and, in future, with the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Collapse of Bosnia-Herzegovina Does Not Seem To Be Probable Now

[Curic] What do you think about the recent changes at the head of the Muslim leadership?

[Bago] The changes you talk about are the internal affairs of the Bosniak-Muslim nation. That should not reflect negatively on the relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; that is, on the Croats and the Bosniak-Muslims in the Federation.

[Curic] IFOR is supposed to stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina for one year. Is it possible to completely stabilize the situation in such a short period?

[Bago] It is hard to say. As we acn see, the present IFOR activities are developing according to plan. Personally, I think that the time limit will have to be extended a bit. First of all, it takes time to diminish tensions, but also to remove some problems on the ground. At this moment, it is hard to say whether there will be any considerable deviation from the agreed time limit.

[Curic] The creation of two entities is seen by some observers as the start of the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Bago] The Dayton agreements are not only on paper, but are supported by the leading world powers. It seems

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more certain at the moment that Bosnia-Herzegovina will survive. I do not believe that there will be a new war, because one would expect a fierce answer from the international community, particularly from the United States.

[Curic] You have spent two years in Switzerland. Have you noticed any similarities to Bosnia?

[Bago] First of all, in Switzerland, all the citizens are Swiss, no matter whether they speak French, German, Italian, or Rhaeto-Romanian, while there are three different constituent nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some solutions, also envisaged by the Dayton agreement, will be based upon the Swiss cantonal model, but will conform to the given circumstances.

B-H: Belgrade Paper Says Croats Want All of Mostar

LD0902134896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1254 GMT 9 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 9 (TANJUG) — E.U. Administrator Hans Koschnick's decree regarding territorial delineation within Mostar is not the true cause of Croats' dissatisfaction resulting in massive demonstrations, the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI said Friday [9 February].

The paper quoted confidential sources as saying Croats wanted entire Mostar, a town in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina divided between them and Moslems, and that they had already proposed that the entire town belong to them.

In exchange, Moslems would get Jajce, a town in western Bosnia.

The paper ironically remarked that it was rather strange that Croats should not offer Moslems Dubrovnik, Croatia's major tourist centre on the Adriatic coast, but Jajce which it said had always been predominantly populated by Moslems and Serbs.

It is evident that Croats intend to cleanse Mostar ethnically as they have done with all the towns they seized in the four years of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the paper said.

Croatia has not made an official request for such an exchange, the situation in Mostar, however, has reached a critical point, signalling war rather than peace in relations between Croats and Moslems, the paper said.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his Italian counterpart Susanna Agnelli have warned the Croats that they back E.U. interests and plans in Mostar, the paper said.

Judging by Kinkel's and Agnelli's reaction, it is evident that the E.U. position in the town has been threatened almost to the point of humiliation, it said.

VECERNJE NOVOSTI said Croatian political elite had placed itself in the service of U.S. interests in Bosnia whose goal it said was to drive away the European Union from the region.

It is more important to Washington to dominate over Europe than to help restore peace to Bosnia, the paper said.

Mostar remained divided into two sections — the east, Moslem and the west, Croat — even following the setting up of the Moslem-Croat Federation under U.S. pressure in March 1994. The town was placed under E.U. administration soon after.

The federation was formed after nearly a year of fierce clashes between Moslems and Croats for control of territories with mixed population.

Before they clashed, Moslems and Croats had jointly expelled about 45,000 Serbs living in the town and nearby localities in the River Neretva valley.

B-H: Mostar Events Test Germany's Alliance With Croatia

LD0902213796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2036 GMT 9 Feb 96

[By Slobodan Jankovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, Feb. 9 (TANJUG) — Germany's alliance with Croatia was put to test after the latest developments in the divided south Bosnian town of Mostar. Judging by reactions of German officials in Bonn and media commentaries, things will have to be settled soon between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, who are here officially said to have close relations.

Foreign policy spokesman for the ruling coalition in Bonn Carl Lammers said that the developments in Mostar were an 'alarm signal' and that something would have to change. He said the atmosphere in Mostar was marked by 'resounding Ustasha fascist songs, sung by Croat masses in local cafes after (the incident that was seen as) the victory against (E.U. administrator in Mostar Hans) Koschnick.'

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who is preparing for a visit to Zagreb next Tuesday, did not hide that he would have to speak sharply with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman about the attack on German official Koschnick.

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Kinkel has much to be angry about because local Croats had promised him during his visit to Mostar on Jan. 14 they would fully abide by the Dayton agreement.

The Croat side on Wednesday rejected Koschnick's decree on the administrative organization of Mostar. In addition, local Croats attacked the E.U. headquarters and trapped Koschnick in his car for an hour.

B-H: Croats To Reestablish Contacts With EU in Mostar

LD1302135696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidential council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia issued a statement today in connection with its eight-hour long session held behind closed doors yesterday, HINA's correspondent Pejo Gasparevic reports.

According to the statement, [Bosnian Croat] Mayor Mijo Brajkovic submitted a report on the implementation of the agreement in Mostar. Taking into account all aspects of the situation, the presidential council extended its support to the [Bosnian Croat] municipal council and instructed it to reestablish contacts with the EU administration in order to find a solution for the city of Mostar.

The council also issued specific instructions to launch proceedings to establish whether the arbiter's decision is in line with the constitution, and to inform the international players about the real position of the Croat entity in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The council also adopted the political and legal principles regarding the justification for reorganizing the the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia into the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. It also adopted reports on the military and security situation.

B-H: HDZ Wants Sarajevo Organized as Federal District

AU1202195296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 7 Feb 96 p 10

[BH-PRESS report: "To Form District of Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Municipal Board in Sarajevo thinks that Sarajevo should be organized like a district within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was also the conclusion of its last session, at which the administrative and political organization of the town was discussed.

Referring to certain provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and simultaneously stating that authorities and the organization of authorities in Sarajevo as a district has not been determined by it, the HDZ requests that the Croats, on an equal footing with the Bosniaks and the others, will participate in the realization of the legislative, executive, and judicial authority in that district.

The legislation of Sarajevo should, according to the request of the municipal HDZ, consist of two houses — the House of Representatives and Senate. Election to the House of Representatives would be carried out in accordance to the national structure of the population in the district. The Senate would consist of 15 representatives — five Bosniaks, five Croats, and five others. The decisions of the district legislative body would be made by the approval of both houses, except for those acts adopted by each of the houses independently. Those are standing orders, regulations, and so on.

According to the same request, the House of Representatives could operate if at least two-thirds of each Croats, Bosniaks, and other representatives, were present. Decisions would be made by majority vote.

An alternative to this proposal on the assembly has been presented. According to the second proposal, the assembly would consist of 45 representatives: 30 of them would be elected by parity — 10 Croats, 10 Bosniaks, and 10 others, and 15 representatives would be elected in accordance with the national structure of the population in the district.

Decisions of vital interest to any of the constituent nations would be made with the consent of the majority of representatives in the legislative body, including the majority of both Bosniak and Croat representatives.

According to the HDZ proposal, the mayor and deputy mayor would head the executive authority in the district. They could not be from the same constituent nation. The mayor would not be able to make decisions without the consent of the deputy mayor. The Municipal authorities would consist of the mayor, deputy mayor, and 13 members. At least a third of the municipal authorities would have to comprise the representatives of the Croatian nation. The decisions that would involve the vital interests of the Croatian nation would be made by consensus.

According to this request, there would be an appeal court with jurisdiction over the municipal ocourts. That court would be the court of first instance in cases that awee not under the jurisdiction of the municipal courts. At least a third of the judges on the district court would have to be Croats.

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The district authorities would be determined by the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the organization of the authority would be determined by the statute of the district of Sarajevo.

The representatives of the Bosniak, Croat, and other nations, and the representatives of the citizens, proportionalte to the ethnic structure of the population in the unit of local self-government, would participate in the authority at the level of local self-government, in line with the constitutional principles for the establishment of the municipal authorities. In any case, the constituent nations would have to be represented.

These requests of the HDZ Municipal Board have been sent to Carl Bildt and to the president and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Slovenia's Kucan Discuss War, Trade

AU1302205496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on meeting between Slovene President Milan Kucan and Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo on 13 Feb — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cumurovic] Talks between Presidents Kucan and Izetbegovic, which began after a long delay caused by the delayed arrival of the large Slovene delegation in Sarajevo, lasted for about two hours. In addition to the inevitable issue of the Dayton accord, which, despite the injustices, nevertheless has succeeded in stopping the killing, the talks also focused on other topics.

[Izetbegovic] We concluded that, in spite of the war, our relations, those between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia, never actually broke down. The war only weakened them; we maintained friendly links, even economic ones. We also concluded with sincere regret that there was a significant trade deficit in trade with Slovenia. We expect the situation to improve with the revival of economic relations. As you know, we had very strong economic relations prior to the war. Our economies are partially complementary, which is a basis on which we expect to build strong economic cooperation.

[Cumurovic] In addition to economic cooperation, Izetbegovic also stressed Slovenia's consistent and manifold support for Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war.

[Izetbegovic] I have used this occasion to thank President Kucan, and through him the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovene people, for the [word indistinct], moral, political, and humanitarian aid that it gave us during the war. Slovenia gave us very strong political support and helped us significantly. Moreover, as regards humanitarian aid, it is well known that Slovenia has taken in a large number of our refugees; today, the number is somewhat less, between 18,000 and 19,000 people.

We also discussed other mutual problems of relations in the region and with the countries that have emerged following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Of course, here we have the problem of succession, relations with Serbia and Croatia, relations with other countries; all in all, these were comprehensive, friendly talks of a predominantly political nature.

[Cumurovic] Slovene President Milan Kucan, whose visit to Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is the first since the war, mentioned in his statement that many statesmen who come to Sarajevo invariably fail to point out that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a victim of aggression. The number one man in the Slovene state listed three objectives of today's visit:

[Kucan, in Slovene] First, we want to confirm our good and friendly relations and we want these relations to develop on the basis of the tradition that we established in the past.

Second, we want to reiterate Slovenia's readiness to [words indistinct] international activities for the implementation of the Dayton accord, which we assess as being realistic and [word indistinct] and a [word indistinct] foundation for the establishment of lasting peace. Our stance is that if it is good for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is good for Slovenia. We want our stance known, which is that Bosnia-Herzegovina is the victim of a war of aggression, that it is necessary to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity within the existing borders, that it is necessary to protect it as a UN member state, and that it is necessary to [word indistinct] as a multi-cultural, multi-national, and multi-confessional community. The third goal was to strengthen and revive existing relations and to broaden them to include not only the economy, but also science, technology, culture, and sports.

[Cumurovic] Following talks between Presidents Kucan and Izetbegovic, a meeting was held between representatives of the Republic and Federation Governments and the Slovene Government. In addition to the 10-member delegation accompanying President Kucan, a large business delegation also arrived in Sarajevo, which will explore with Bosnian businessmen possibilities for further cooperation.

Finally, I would like to remind you that Bosnia-Herzegovina recognized Slovenia on 19 March 1992,

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while Slovenia recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on 9 April 1992, which speaks for the very good diplomatic relations between the two countries, both victims of aggression by the Yugoslav People's Army and the Serbian regime.

B-H: Izetbegovic Sums Up Talks With Slovene President

LD1302233896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Milan Kucan, president of the Republic of Slovenia, was on a one-day visit to Sarajevo today. His host was Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted] Senada Cumurovic has a report.

[Cumurovic] The talks between presidents Kucan and Izetbegovic, which started with a considerable delay because of the late arrival of the large Slovene delegation in Sarajevo, lasted for about two hours. Besides the unavoidable issue of the Dayton agreement, which in spite of injustices has nevertheless stopped the killing, Izetbegovic said, some other issues were discussed.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] We concluded that relations between Slovenia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have never in practice — in spite of the war — been suspended. They were just weakened by the war. Friendly relations, even economic relations, were maintained. We concluded that there is a considerable trade deficit in our trade relations with Slovenia. We expect conditions to improve through the revival of the economic relations. As you know, we had very strong economic relations before the war. Our economies are partly complementary, and this could be a basis for strong economic cooperation. [end recording]

[Cumurovic] Apart from economic cooperation, Izetbegovic stressed Slovenia's constant support for Bosnia-Herzegovina in different spheres during the war.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I used this opportunity to thank President Kucan, and through him the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovene people, for all the moral, political, and humanitarian support they offered us during [words indistinct]. We have had very strong political support from Slovenia, which helped us a great deal. Speaking about the humanitarian side of the problem, it is known that Slovenia has housed a large number of our refugees. Nowadays that number is a bit smaller. As far as I know, it is between 18,000 and 19,000.

Of course, we discussed other problems which we have in common, which have to do with relations with the countries formed after the collapse of Yugoslavia. These are the problems of the division of assets, relations with Serbia, Croatia, relations with other countries. All in all, these were comprehensive friendly talks predominantly of a political nature. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Siljadzic Party's Chances in Elections Evaluated

AU1302152296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 p 1

[Commentary by Emil Habul: "Pre-Electoral Calculations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Haris Silajdzic announced that he was founding a party with which he will participate in the elections. He did not say anything else, but he did use the occasion to comment on other, general political issues. This is enough for a pre-electoral presentation. There is still time for details regarding the party itself, election tactics, coalitions, and the like. A little mystery cannot harm anyone's election campaign; it prompts the people to guess and come up with their own calculations. Such an election competition gains popularity, while the person discussed gains supporters and voters.

It is not difficult to forecast that Silajdzic will place his future party in the political center and that he will cloak it in civic garb. Silajdzic will attempt to reconcile Bosniak tradition and a contemporary European orientation. This concept has already won the West's support. A much more strenuous struggle will take place on domestic ground.

The ways of conducting the electoral struggle are an equation with two unknowns. If the new party goes it alone, it will have to snatch votes away from both the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the opposition parties. If Silajdzic joins forces with the opposition, then there remains only the battle with the SDA. The SDA has several aces — institutions — in its favor: the army and the police on the one hand, and the Islamic community and Bosniak intellectuals on the other. It has, moreover, already built its party apparatus. This machinery is more crucial in elections than the quality of offered programs and the qualities of the individuals representing them.

However, we can only talk about a true electoral competition in the territory controlled by the Bosnian Army. There is no political competition in areas where the Croatian Democratic Community and the Croatian Defense Council have authority. It will be interesting to see how the competition will go in the Serbian entity, in the Banja Luka region: Will Karadzic's or Milosevic's

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camp win? Regardless of who wins, nothing much will change in Bosnia.

The only question on the territory controlled by the legitimate Bosnian authorities is whether the SDA will retain the monopoly or whether a division in the balance of power will be achieved. However, nothing will change at the level of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton constitution and the election rules have been tailored to ensure the victory of national parties. The victory of, for example, Bogic Bogicevic or Miro Lazovic is not possible in the Serb entity. Everything is in favor of national, rather than civic representation. Moreover, the voting of expatriates will give the edge to the ruling parties. They are the only ones organized abroad, and it is an old rule that says that he one who is organized, wins. Nevertheless, the appearance of Silajdzic will give the electoral competition an edge, but only in areas where the former prime minister could walk freely during the war.

B-H: Commentary Views Possible Party Coalitions

AU1302195296 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 7 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Fadil Mandal: "Doors Are Not Closed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has started, it has started... The cards have slowly been revealed and secret wishes and hopes are coming out. The election campaign has started. There is no official sign to start, but there is a strong feeling among the parties that make up Bosnia's political stage that there is less and less time until the September "D-Day."

Two events have crucially influenced the sudden election machine moving into top gear: the recent session of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] Main Committee and the final split between this, the largest Bosnian party, and former Prime Minister Dr. Haris Silajdzic.

According to them, the opposition parties slowly, but to political experts noticeably, are embarking on reorganization and differentiation. Coalitions, which until recently were thought of as impossible, are becoming more and more certain. Some of them arise out of necessity or the similarity of their political standpoints and policies, others with strong support and pressure from international players, which it is being proved nowadays are very interested in the final result of the first postwar elections in Bosnia.

With the Help of His Friends

The one who first mentioned concrete names was SDA Vice President Dr. Ejup Ganic, having announced a possible electoral coalition between his party and the Civic Democratic Party. Although along the lines of the SDA, the idea of the formation of a wider association called "The Front for a Democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina" can nevertheless be characterized as merely feeling the opposition's pulse.

The logic is probably to check whether among the local parties there are still any interested in such a coalition. Of course, one should not be naive and imagine that there are no serious and concrete talks about this going on behind the scenes, but what reaches the public does not indicate that SDA is currently enjoying any substantial success in this direction.

On the other hand, it is very likely that Dr. Haris Silajdzic is also working on a similar project, with the "little" help of his friends in the world. Namely, no ostrich-like burying one's head in the sand can hide the political fact that U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, during his visit to Sarajevo, had a separate meeting with the former Bosnian prime minister.

The local media did not have a chance to record what they were talking about in the presence of Richard Holbrooke (Christopher's assistant), but Silajdzic's statement to Ljubljana DELO after the meeting is suggestive. In the statement, Silajdzic talks about his intention to "work for the democratic development of Bosnia."

Does this mean that the United States in such activities is backing Dr. Silajdzic?

Although, in principle, it is not allowed for one state to meddle in the election campaign of another sovereign and independent state, things should nevertheless be looked at in a pragmatic and realistic manner, bearing in mind that the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the world depends on many things. Such an open expression of sympathy will happen again and not only toward Silajdzic. The ruling parties, and particularly the SDA, will therefore have to find an appropriate answer to this and similar challenges.

Kadic's "Suggestion"

So what about the differentiation within the opposition? The Liberals and their leader Rasim Kadic have finally concretely presented their own activities and intentions (which were hitherto only to be found in the political lobbies) at a recent news conference.

"The LS [Liberal Party] and Dr. Haris Silajdzic agreed last week on some elements associated with a possible political appearance," Kadic said on that occasion. It is not completely clear whether those words anticipate Silajdzic's arrival among the Liberals or perhaps a wider coalition of opposition forces.

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A "suggestion" by Kadic sent to the former prime minister also shows that this is still unripe. It says that Kadic hopes that Silajdzic "will not veer too far to the left," which tells us that the rivalry in the opposition, regarding Silajdzic, is of no small proportions. The recent behavior of the Bosnian Liberals should not be understood as setting their own position in concrete. One should rather see it as, and all Liberals in the world are known for this, their inclination toward pragmatism.

A political fox such as Rasim Kadic will certainly never completely shut the doors to any possible electoral cooperation with the SDA, which puts him and his party among the most desirable coalition partners, as much for the government as for the opposition.

The two social democratic parties, the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the UBSD [Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats] are also looking for political partners for the next elections. For the time being, they are talking about joint appearance in larger towns. It is not impossible that the SDP goes it alone into the elections, particularly as the polls give this party more votes than any other opposition party.

As matters stand now, cooperation between Durakovic [SDP leader] and Silajdzic is not likely. A change would certainly occur if a wider coalition were created (without left and right animosities), or if SDP Vice President Zlatko Lagumdzija showed a preference for Silajdzic (which, according to some reports, is the case).

This latter possibility as a form is certainly the most dangerous for the survival of an individual opposition party, if not all of them. The new party headed by Dr. Silajdzic would collect the majority of their votes, and would not spare the SDA, either. At least, that is what public opinion is saying at the moment.

Talking about politics, everything is possible, even some rather impossible combinations that are doing the rounds in the lobbies. Will it be at the end of the race, in the second half of September, standing next to each other, Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic rejoicing as the winners who are then forced to make a post-election coalition? It is a difficult question, full of hypotheses, but not without an answer, or at least a possibility to think about it as early as today.

B-H: Izetbegovic Promises Help to Srebrenica Refugees

LD1002200196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Feb 96

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] State Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic met refugees from Podrinje in Tuzla today. The topic of the talks, which lasted over two hours, was the fate of 10,000 people about whom nothing is known. The hard refugee reality was also discussed. Enes Kuzmancevic reports.

[Kuzmancevic] Several thousand refugees from Podrinje, gathered in the Mejdan sports center in Tuzla, today greeted President Izetbegovic with loud applause and thanks for his care for people from Podrinje.

President Izetbegovic told the residents from Podrinje that he had come to meet the people, to listen to them, and to attempt to agree together with them further steps in search for the truth on Srebrenica.

[Izetbegovic] "I promise you that the rest of my life will be dedicated to solving this issue." [passage indistinct]

[Kuzmancevic] Together with compassion with the suffering and hardships of Srebrenica residents and with all people from Podrinje, President Izetbegovic expressed his understanding for their worries for close relatives, about whom nothing is known. He also underlined the complexity and difficulty of the problem.

[Izetbegovic] "Unfortunately, out of 10 of your questions nine are often left without an answer. Simply, they are impossible to answer. We have no answers.

"My dear brothers and sisters I may be wrong, but I will never lie to my people, I gave an oath never to lie. I do not wish to lie to you. The situation is very difficult and unfortunately, very bad. There is not much hope. There is a small ray of hope of finding several tens, maybe hundreds of people. But for thousands there is no hope. I will not lie to you. That is the situation. I have talked with Mr. Shattuck, the U.S. representative for human rights, a very honest and energetic man who visited Srebrenica a few days ago. He also visited Ljubija, [words indistinct] to see mass graves. I talked a few days ago with Rehn, before that of course I have talked to Mazowiecki several times, with (?Nowak), several times with representatives of the Red Cross.

"To tell you honestly, the situation is not good. This does not mean that we should not continue, with even more energy, the search for our people, to continue the search for truth, for the ones who are alive, the ones who are dead, and finally the ones who are guilty for this tragedy, first and foremost for the criminals from among the chetniks, butchers, to be adequately punished. [passage indistinct]

"The indifference of the world faced with such a tragedy hurts; and it has always hurt us. But it is not only the world that is guilty. We should also look inward; whether we have done the best, both we in Sarajevo and you in Srebrenica. Maybe it is not the best moment

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to discuss this, but we will have to raise the inevitable question. [passage indistinct]. Who has behaved how in Srebrenica and who has in the critical moment has [words indistinct]."

[Kuzmancevic] President Izetbegovic recalled some facts that prove what efforts had been made to preserve the people of Srebrenica and Podrinje. Although the U.S. Congress was about to vote in favor of the decision to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, we withdrew our demand for the embargo to be lifted because of the difficult situation in Srebrenica, and demanded instead that the people in Podrinje be protected. No one from Bosnia-Herzegovina's leadership has ever discussed the possibility of exchanging Srebrenica, President Izetbegovic said, commenting on the aggressor's perfidious propaganda that is not yet over. We must not allow manipulations with the problem of Srebrenica, President Izetbegovic said, and added that this was a huge human issue.

[Izetbegovic] "We are living in strange times. Bosnia-Herzegovina [words indistinct]. So if anyone tells you anything about Srebrenica, ask him not what he said about Srebrenica, but what he did about it; what he did for the unfortunate people of [words indistinct], to alleviate the situation, to help out. What he did, not what he said because, as I said, strange times have come [words indistinct].

"So do not allow anyone to politicize Srebrenica. This is a human problem. This is not for politics. This is not a problem for gaining political points."

[Kuzmancevic] During the talks that lasted more than two hours, refugees from Srebrenica and Podrinje asked many questions, referring mainly to the fate of the missing, to aid, care for the refugees, and their return to their homes. Naser Oric, the commander of Srebrenica defense, addressed the refugees in connection with that:

[Oric] "It is true that we paid the dearest price in Podrinje, but we must not allow our Podrinje [words indistinct]. Whoever survived must return."

[Kuzmancevic] President Izetbegovic promised that the truth will be sought in all possible ways, and that we will persevere in demanding the punishment for all criminals, so that a crime against the Bosniak people never happens again. President Izetbegovic suggested the following:

[Izetbegovic] "Let us form a small committee, consisting of five people, which will deal exclusively with the problem of Srebrenica. Let the state and both governments do their jobs, the cantons and the municipalities, too, but let there be a supervisory body that you can turn to, whose members you will know, to (?enable) you to follow what is going on, to have an idea of what can be done (?to right) the injustice you suffered, [words indistinct], and so on. The committee should consist of one representative of the republican and one of the federal government, two of your representatives, and one representative of the canton." [passage indistinct]

B-H: Government To Set Up Srebrenica Commission

AU1302212196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at yesterday's session reviewed the report on missing persons and refugees from the territory of the Srebrenica and Zepa Municipalities. Following the opening addresses and the debate, the Republic Assembly passed the following conclusions:

1. We must step up searches for the missing persons. The present State Commission for Prisoner Exchanges must be reorganized into a commission for tracing missing persons. The commission should include one of two candidates to be nominated by the Podrinje [Drina valley] women's organization. Not a single [word indistinct] case that affords any hope must be neglected or not investigated.

2. At future Assembly sessions this commission will submit reports on the progress achieved since the previous one until such time as the Assembly decides otherwise.

3. Help will be extended to the delegation of Podrinje women to visit Srebrenica and the surrounding area as soon as the weather permits.

4. Services for the investigation of war crimes will pay attention to the circumstances of the Srebrenica tragedy with the goal of identifying war criminals who ordered and committed the crimes. [Words indistinct] services will strengthen cooperation with international organizations and institutions [words indistinct] can help.

5. The Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina requests the government and its relevant bodies to compile a comprehensive report on the problems of missing and captured persons and refugees, including a report by the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the military circumstances surrounding the fall of Srebrenica.

6. The Assembly will request that appropriate government bodies compile detailed reports on the behavior of international [words indistinct] the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and others, prior to, during, and

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following the Srebrenica tragedy. The Assembly proposes that the Federation Government appoint financial inspectors or a commission that would be especially established for this purpose, to investigate [words indistinct] donations for Srebrenica in order to establish whether the donations were used [words indistinct] and whether there was any abuse of this [words indistinct]. The Assembly will see to it that [words indistinct] Podrinje who fled after the fall of Srebrenica and who are now in school, are awarded scholarships starting with a minimum of 50 German marks per month. This should mark the beginning of a project aimed at awarding scholarships to all refugee children who have remained in the country.

9. [number as heard] Podrinje citizens who fled after the fall of Srebrenica should appoint a liaison officer to represent before the State Presidency, the Republic, Federation, and cantonal Governments. This officer would have the status and authority to request and be given all types of information pertaining to the search for missing persons and the general position of the Srebrenica refugees.

10. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, together with the Federation Government, is required to prepare a program for the solving of the material and social status of refugees, expelled and displaced persons.

B-H: Muslim Survivor on Mass Shootings; Accuses Mladic

BR1202150296 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 10 Feb 96 p 6

[Report on interview with Bosnian Muslim Hurem Suljic by Francesco Battistini; date, place not given: "Mladic Laughed as They Shot Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo — The only time he smiled — and you could not tell whether it was out of anger or fear — was when he asked the barman for a glass of mineral water, and he was reminded of the rusty drum on Bravica hill: "The Serbs brought it there full of water. We were already lined up as they loaded their automatic rifles. One of them laughed and said: This water is for you; take it to hell."

It was only by good fortune that Hurem Suljic avoided death. Today this pale, moustached 55-year-old from Bostobarina, who looks 10 years older, is one of the many refugees from Tuzla. But on 11 July 1995 he was living in Srebrenica. He was arrested by the Bosnian Serbs, together with thousands of others, taken to the forest and shot. But they missed. He pretended to be dead, among the other corpses. But he survived, to coexist with the nightmare of that night spent in a common grave.

"When Srebrenica was taken," he said, "my son, Hadrija, was at the front. I, however, was at home with my wife, Raza, and our daughter, Vaida. The Serbs surrounded the house and, through megaphones, told us to come out and that they would not harm us. Many of them wore UN uniforms. But it was soon apparent that they were Chetniks." Many people escaped into the forest. Hurem, an invalid, could not: "The Serbs took us, and Ratko Mladic ordered his men to separate us. Women, old people, and children on one side; us on the other. Some buses arrived, and the first group were taken away. I remained with the soldiers, and was taken to Potocar. We stayed there all night, out in the open. The next day we were loaded onto cattle trucks and told: We are going to Brutunac, a few kilometers away. Then, together with 250 others, I was ordered off the truck and into an old warehouse. It was in ruins, and had no windows. I noticed that one of the Chetniks guarding us was a fellow from Glogovo whom I know."

It did not take Hurem long to figure out what was going on. "We were ordered to leave the warehouse in groups of 20. Almost immediately I heard shots. After a few minutes they ceased. They left us there another night."

On the morning of 13 July the Muslims, desperate, asked what would happen to them: "Mladic took a megaphone and told us that he wanted to exchange us for prisoners of the Bosnian Army. And that whoever was not exchanged would go to fight with Fikret Abdic (the Bosnian magnate allied with the Serbs — CORRIERE DELLA SERA editor's note). Later we were told to leave the warehouse and to look straight ahead. But out of the corner of my eye I saw that they had gone to fetch caterpillar tractors and that there were corpses already on the ground. Some 300-400 people with their throats cut or shot through the head."

The nightmare was not over: "We were taken from Bratunac to Karakai. There were 180 of us, in a school sports ground 35 meters by 50. We were given nothing to eat or drink. There was only one toilet, and soldiers who demanded our gold, money, and watches. They warned that if anyone concealed valuables they would kill him and the 10 people closest to him. Then Mladic reappeared. He said that there would be no exchange of prisoners. 'What can I do about it if the Bosnian Government does not want you back?' He announced that we would be taken to the camp at Batkovic, 3 km from Bjeljna, and sent off with Abdic's troops. Now I was really scared."

The fourth day: "The Serbs arrived with Tamic trucks. We were loaded on, 30 at a time, starting at 1400 hours. At 1930 hours my turn came. They carried me 2 km. When I climbed out of the Tamic, there were dozens of

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corpses there. They arranged us in five lines, two meters apart. Some people were blindfolded. People cried, and asked why they were doing this. Mladic was in a red jeep, and shouted: 'Shut up, balija (a pejorative term for Muslims — CORRIERE DELLA SERA editor's note).' And he ordered his men to hurry. Before shooting us, they gave us that damned water. I was at the end of a row, the furthest away from the Chetnik who shot us. I was not hit. I threw myself on the ground, under the others. I pretended to be dead. One Serb asked: 'What shall we do now?' Mladic laughed: 'Ask them if they need anything.' He left. I was alive."

Hurem stayed there the night of 14-15 July. He was terrified: "For hours I hardly breathed. When I was sure that the Chetniks had gone, I raised my head. I whispered: 'I am here, I am from Srebrenica. Can anyone speak?' I heard a voice: 'Yes, brother, I am alive.'"

The other survivor, Meludin Ovic, was 19. "I told him to follow me, to crawl over the ground with me. We passed a hedge. We heard a truck coming. It was the Serbs again. One of them saw our tracks. They tried to find us, then gave up. We made off." Their escape was difficult: "Meludin had a fever. I dragged him along and encouraged him. We walked for two days. At one point I found an apple tree and climbed up to pick some. From there I looked around and saw a fellow approaching. I trembled, thinking he was a Serb. But he said that he too was from Srebrenica. And he had escaped from a grave, like us."

The three of them continued together. They came across a Chetnik checkpoint but managed to escape. Until they reached a river and found another escapee: "He was crazed with fear and could not stop talking. But we took him with us."

Salvation arrived. "The crazy guy approached the Serb lines on his own, singing. They saw him. But they started laughing and let him pass. A few hours later, after dark, we heard someone calling: 'Are you the ones from Srebrenica?' The crazy man had told them about us. And our friends came to pull us out of the nightmare."

B-H: Serbs Prosecutor Accuses 3 Muslims of War Crimes

LD1402112696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0842 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bileca, 14 Feb (TANJUG) — The military prosecutor's office in Bileca filed a request for an inquiry against three members of the Muslim army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the well-founded grounds that they were involved in the killing of Serb civilians and captured soldiers.

The request has been filed against Haris Kalamujic (33), Amir Dizdarevic (26), both from Sarajevo, and Enes Strahonic (36) of Gorazde, TANJUG learned from Serb military sources.

In 1992 Kalamujic and Dizdarevic were allowed by their friend Meho Sebo, head of the Sarajevo district prison, to abduct from the prison a civilian, Goran Cajovic of Srbinje. They took him to Bembasa and ordered him to flee, and then shot him in the back.

On 29 October 1994 in the region of Dujmovic on Mt. Treskavica, Kalamujic and Dizdarevic captured Brano Dragas and Goran Perisic, members of the 11th Herzegovina brigade of Serb Army. The captured soldiers were tied to some wooden poles and then run over by a remote-controlled vehicle.

On 19 December 1992 in Josanica, near Srbinje, Enes Strahonic killed civilian Milutin Perovic while taking part in a massacre of the local Serb population, when 57 women, children, and elderly were killed.

Kalamujic and Dizdarevic were members of the 152nd Brigade, and Strahonic of the 808th Brigade of the Muslim army. All three are being detained in the military prison in Srbinje.

B-H: Serb Opposition Seeks End to SDS Media Monopoly

LD0902235596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2044 GMT 9 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 9 Feb (TANJUG) — Opposition political parties in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic (RS) held in Banja Luka today a consultative meeting at which it was concluded that further cooperation in political activities, especially in the pre-election campaign, is essential.

The primary task is to define "the minimum of common interests and responsibilities [necessary] for Serb national and political unity," it was said at the meeting, initiated and organized by the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic (SPRS).

Representatives of the opposition parties of the Serb Republic, none of whom at present are represented in the Assembly, have also discussed preparations for the next elections in the Serb Republic. They have agreed to request a meeting with the minister of information in the Serb Republic government, with the aim of abolishing the monopoly of the ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in the state media.

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Present at the meeting were, beside the host SPRS, representatives of the Popular Radical Party "Nikola Pasic," Democratic Party of Krajina, Serb Patriotic Party, Party of the Independent Social Democrats, Popular Party, Party of the Democratic Progress, United Left of the Serb Republic, and the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, Liberal Party of Banja Luka, and the Serb Democratic Union-Homeland Front.

There are 26 registered political parties in the Serb Republic and all of them — with the exception of the SDS — have their headquarters in Banja Luka. SDS is the only party represented in the Popular Assembly of RS.

An official announcement from today's meeting of the opposition parties will be issued tomorrow, it was announced.

B-H: Serb Liberal Leader on Future State, Milosevic

AU1202161996 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 18

[Interview with Miodrag Zivanovic, chairman of the Liberal Party of the Serb Republic, by Ejub Stitovac; place and date not given: "Our Salvation Is in the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stitovac] During his visit to the U.S. troops in Tuzla, U.S. President Clinton received two distinguished Serb politicians from Bosnia-Herzegovina: Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic and Vladimir Srebrov from Sarajevo. Does that basically mean a well-defined U.S. attitude toward certain politicians in the future Bosnia-Herzegovina elections?

[Zivanovic] It certainly does. I think that such an attitude prefers personalities who have remained normal and reasonable amidst this tragedy of ours and everything else that I would call the human paradox. That is good in any case.

I know Radic because we live in the same city, and I think he is a man with far broader views than what others have reduced to ethnicity. As an economist, he can make a great contribution to the reconstruction of our devastated country, while, as a man, he can contribute to the building of some new relations that will hopefully ensure mutual cohabitation sooner or later.

As for Srebrov, I know a lot about his past. He was in prison during the war years, but whether that will prove a benefit in the coming elections is an open question. He can certainly contribute with his authority and capabilities to the building of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is what we should develop in the future despite everything that has happened.

[Stitovac] At the session of the Belgrade Circle, you said that the only solution for the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to stay in the unified state that would consist of two entities.

[Zivanovic] Well, that is the only chance for us to see light at the end of the tunnel and to struggle for the future of not only our generation, but also of future generations, to put it pathetically. I believe the Serb, Croat, and Muslim national questions can only be resolved within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Stitovac] What will happen if the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, envisaged by the Dayton accord, turns out to be just a farce?

[Zivanovic] If that happens, woe to us all. I think that if the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina were to be merely a transitional solution for a year or two, just to satisfy the demands of the international community, after which the entities would merge with their mother countries, then we would not stand a chance. We shall remain liveingin ethnically pure states, which is unimaginable and uncivilized at the end of the 20th century. In that case, those states will not attract foreign investors, and they themselves own no capital. Our children and grandchildren would have to carry weapons. There is no future in that. If future events strengthen the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even with more attributes than anticipated by the Dayton accord, I believe we will be able to go further.

[Stitovic] Objectively speaking, how politically powerful and strong are the parties with a civil orientation, like your Liberal Party?

[Zivanovic] It is well known that the liberals in Banja Luka have been struggling for years against nationalism and everything that led to this tragedy of ours. How successful we are in that remains to be seen. I reckon that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina — in Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar and many other cities — it is possible to build something that could be called the beginning of civil democracy in spite of so many deaths, victims and, openly said, the huge bloodshed. Precisely because the nationalistic bloc has been shaken, the civil option in Bosnia-Herzegovina has realistic chances of achieving something. What can be achieved, and to what extent, remains to be seen.

[Box, p. 18]

[Stitovac] According to your opinion and assessment, has President of Serbia Milosevic definitely written off Karadzic and Mladic?

[Zivanovic] As far as I know, Milosevic did that a year ago. That refers for the most part to Karadzic, while,

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regarding Mladic, further pressure has been applied by the international community, and the tribunal in The Hague has also been putting pressure on Milosevic to write off Mladic as well, if he has not been written off yet. I want to say that the influence of President Milosevic in the Serb Republic is quite great and respectable.

[Stitovac] How do you, personally and from the point of view of the Liberal Party, see Milosevic?

[Zivanovic] As for my judgments of President Milosevic and my personal view, I will never forget, or we in the Liberal Party will never forget, that he is still one of the main architects of this war, regardless of his asserting himself as a peacemaker. There were even proposals to award him with the Nobel Peace Prize. That reflects not so much on Milosevic's moral inconsistency, as on the fact that he is really an artist and connoisseur of his job. Since you have already asked me, in my opinion and assessment, President Milosevic is only authentic as a ruler. There is no ideology behind him. For instance, in the 1980's, he used to be a bolshevik, only to turn nationalist in late 1980's, because that was necessary at the time, and now he is a peacemaker. Milosevic's greatest problem is how to meet with authentic communists, nationalists, and peacemakers. Regardless of my disagreement with many of his moves, I think he is a respectable political figure.

B-H: Correspondent Views Work of Intelligence Agencies

LD1102203996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina is the largest battlefield on our planet where many things happen behind the scenes. The presence of the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies in this area is further proof of that. The extent of the presence of the people from the shadows, the level and importance of the intelligence operations are all underlined by the fact that for the first time in history one of these agencies has publicly revealed its mission. It was done by the biggest and the most powerful — the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA.

[Correspondent Jadranko Katana] According to a State Department announcement, the CIA's duty is the protection of NATO soldiers and help in the investigation of war crimes. According to results achieved so far, significant successes have been achieved in both directions. Thanks to CIA engagement, the existence of mass graves in Srebrenica came to light and the information gathered has been sent to the right place — the Hague tribunal. In the implementation of this task, there were no significant problems to be expected, especially when we know the almost limitless potential of the sophisticated technology and equipment used for intelligence purposes.

The serious danger for the NATO soldiers does not come from Mladic's paramilitary forces, which are in a state of dissolution. Its biggest wish now, after last year's lesson learned from air strikes and the situation of anarchy in Karadzic creation, is not to cross IFOR's [Implementation Force's] path.

Even less danger comes from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian units, as both states will be included soon in the Partnership for Peace program. The final American takeover of the leadership role in NATO automatically means its much stronger presence and involvement, which is of course, now followed by quiet but decisive reorganization of the alliance.

Europe's painful narrowing of authority has caused sparks in relations of the traditional rivalry of member-states' intelligence services. The position of London and Paris — that Europeans should primarily be the ones in charge of European security — has had as a result the creation of Rapid Reaction Force, a formation within NATO made of mainly of English and French soldiers. The Rapid Reaction Force is made up of two thirds of IFOR soldiers. The commander of these troups is General Mike Walker, who has chosen, perhaps by coincidence, the hotel complex in Ilidza [Serb suburb of Sarajevo] for his headquarters.

The number of 240 intelligence officers in the headquarters is intriguing, as is the fact that only in Ilidza and nowhere else, not even in the volatile Mostar, is the firing at IFOR vehicles and soldiers a regular occurence. The majority of attacks has happened in the vicinity of the headquarters. The IFOR spokesman does not give any details except that the investigation is in progress.

The American demand that Carl Bildt not use the telephone links the United Nations used also demonstrates the depth of caution and mistrust, because most of the links used by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] was under the surveillance from the British Special Air Service.

The Dayton agreement has verbal support of the whole international community. But it is evident that the world power centers have not agreed on what they wish to achieve and how to go about achieving it, not only in the country they have not allowed to defend itself from aggression but also in their mutual relations and positions. And so the intelligence war goes on.

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Croatia: Tudjman Meets Holbrooke, Gives 'Full Support'

LD1302135996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has received in the Presidential Palace Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state, and members of his delegation. During the talks, Croatia's commitment to the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement was confirmed once again. Drazen Korda reports:

[Korda] After the meeting with President Tudjman and senior Croat officials, Richard Holbrooke said that, with the visit to Zagreb, after Sarajevo and Belgrade, he had completed his mission of support to the Dayton agreement. From President Dr. Tudjman I have received confirmation of his commitment to the peace agreement, Holbrooke said. He then recounted the results of his Sarajevo visit to the correspondents.

According to Holbrooke, the two Serb officers, war crimes suspects, have been transferred to The Hague prison in the Netherlands. The Bosnian Government has unilaterally accepted the so-called rules of the road, which will enable IFOR [Implemtation Force] forces to detain war crimes suspects at the official request of the Hague tribunal.

Foreign Affairs Minister Mate Granic, who took part in the talks, also spoke to the press. He said that Croatia gives its full support to Richard Holbrooke's efforts. Granic also said that the U.S. assistant secretary of state has been informed of the adoption of the Croatian law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. There was also talk on ways of strengthening the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and finding ways for a solution to the situation in Mostar that would be both honorable and represent a compromise.

Present at the talks were, from the U.S. side, John Shattuck, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights, and American Ambassador Peter Galbraithe. From the Croat side were Dr. Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ivica Kostovic; Ivan Cervenko, chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army Corps General; and Dr. Zeljko Majtic, the president's adviser for foreign policy.

Croatia: Tudjman, Granic in Talks With Holbrooke

LD1302185896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, received Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state, and his aides in Zagreb today. The main issues discussed in the presidential palace were: the Dayton Agreement, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the situation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Mostar. After the meeting, Richard Holbrooke and Foreign Minister Mate Granic, who was among those who took part in the talks, made short statements. Drazen Korda reports. [passage omitted]

[Korda] Having described the talks as very constructive and having expressed Croatia's full support for cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, said in conclusion:

[Begin Granic recording] We informed Mr. Holbrooke that the government of the Republic of Croatia has initiated a law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. We expect a debate on this law to take place this month. We are also constantly in touch with Mr. Goldstone [leading official in the Hague tribunal].

Other issues were discussed as well: how to strengthen the federation, how to solve, in an honorable and compromising way, the situation in Mostar. [end recording]

[Korda] The meeting was attended by, among others, Dr. Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; Corps General Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army; Dr. Ivica Kostovic, deputy prime minister; and Hido Biscevic, assistant minister of foreign affairs. On the U.S. side John Shattuck, U.S. assistant secretary for human rights, and Ambassador Galbraith, were also present.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives East Slavonia's Gen Klein

LD1402000196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has received in the presidential palace, from where Vera Tomasek reports, General Jacques Klein, the interim administrator in eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem [Srem]. It is expected that their talks will focus on the reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje into the state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia, and, in this connection, the implementation of the Basic Agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem.

Also present at the talks are Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; Ivica Kostovic, deputy prime minister; Ivan Jarnjak, minister of internal affairs; and prefects Branimir Glavas and Vladimir Osus and their colleagues.

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Croatia: Dokmanovic: Serbs Not Violating Slavonia Accord

AU1402102396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the Srem-Baranja District Council, stated that major diplomatic activity is under way in the region, with the goal of establishing the transition administration in the Srem-Baranja district. Furthermore, he said that it was not such a simple task after all, and that the district negotiating team had pointed that out, because the administration has not been established in the past three months, and it is not known when all of its institutions would begin working. Dokmanovic added that talks about the accommodation of soldiers and police of the international peace forces are being held and that it would take some time to find offices for the transition administration in Vukovar, which were razed.

We are not doing anything in violation of the agreement, and our intention to settle somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000 families, which is approximately 30,000 people, in the district this year does not infringe the agreement. The program is being mapped out and will soon be presented to the public. Not only does the program provide for their accommodation, but it also includes the existential needs of those families, including jobs, cultivated land for farmers, and sufficient educational facilities, from kindergartens to colleges. Everything we do is in keeping with the agreement, emphasized Dokmanovic. He said he hopes the international community will exert enough influence on Croatia to force it to implement the agreement, primarily for the sake of preserving the reputation of the international community.

Croatia: Minister: Zagreb Condemns Attacks on Koschnick

LD1302173596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Andjelko Perincic] Stressing that during the ministerial talks support was expressed for the peaceful reintegration of the remaining occupied areas of Croatia, Minister Granic added that Belgrade's support should also be expected for the efforts of Jacques Klein, the interim administrator [of eastern Slavonia]. Granic also reported on the situation in the liberated areas of Croatia and the preparations for a law on cooperation with the Hague court. Speaking about Croatian policy regarding our country's strategic interests in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and especially regarding the tensions in Mostar, Granic said:

[Begin Granic recording] Croatia condemns the attacks on Mr. Koschnick [EU administrator of Mostar] and will do everything to see that an honorable compromise solution is found for both the Croat and Muslim peoples. This solution should be found in direct talks between Croat and Muslim representatives in the federation. We have been working intensively on this over the past few days. We believe a solution will be found that will be welcomed by the EU, and we support Mr. Koschnick and his mission, but solutions should certainly ensure the full survival of both peoples and their equality, and both sides should also be able to preserve their cultural and national identity, especially the Croats in Mostar. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: Germany's Kinkel Discusses Mostar With Matesa

LD1302204496 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to news just in, Klaus Kinkel, German vice chancellor, left Zagreb about half an hour ago. Just before his departure he had talks with Prime Minister Matesa.

[Unidentified correspondent] [Passage omitted] Vice Chancellor Kinkel and Prime Minister Matesa also discussed issues concerning the strengthening of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the search for a compromise solution for Mostar.

[Begin Matesa recording] We talked about the efforts of Croatia and Croats in Mostar to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Mostar, a solution that would be satisfactory to all sides. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Croatia confirmed its readiness to help with the organization of the return of Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees who will be passing through Croatia on their way back from Germany to their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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FYROM: Media Links to Ruling Coalition Criticized

AU1302133096 Skopje DELO in Macedonian 9 Feb 96 p 9

[Commentary by Vlado Mokrov: "Gligorov, Alliance, Journalism..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] When, on 6 February, at about 1530, the author of this commentary heard the first words of Kiro Gligorov's "address to the nation" on television, his first thought was that it was a coup d'etat. For him, it was the second such coup after the one in 1990, when the position of the institution of president of the republic was changed with the Constitution of 1991, that is, when parliamentary Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was transformed into a type of semipresidential system. However, it is the author's opinion that the president's authority cannot hinder the parliament, which forms the government in conformity with parliamentary election results.

Why did Kiro Gligorov, without any constitutional authority, resort to this direct, overly public, and overly propagandistic move (his "address" was broadcast throughout the day by the state and private television stations—at least in Skopje), to influence the relations in the Alliance for Macedonia coalition and the new government? Why did he try to do this when, just after his election, he said that he would act as the president of all Macedonian citizens? Has he not identified himself with the whole state in the sense of "The state, that is me?" Has he not linked the possible break up of the Alliance with the domestic and international survival of Macedonia as if "Macedonia is the Alliance for Macedonia" and will be annihilated without the Alliance? The logic would be that all those who are not in the Alliance, all those who do not support it as a "creation," or, God save us, are its political rivals, are nothing but enemies of the state and people, and (by the simple fact that they do not belong to the "election coalition") they are trying to demolish the "internal stability of the country," its "international position," and God knows what else. In brief, they are the foremost enemies of their own state and people! Enemies in the name of "democracy and economic prosperity."

Finally, did Gligorov address the public, as he said at the beginning, or did he appeal to the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Alliance, as he said at the end of this officially titled "Statement by the President of the Republic Kiro Gligorov"?

If he addressed the public, which is politically and in many other ways miscellaneous, why should the public be concerned with the relations in the Alliance? Particularly, knowing that a great many members of the public have never voted for the Alliance and do not intend to do so. If he appealed to the LP [Liberal Party] and the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], why did he not do this in his own "common house," that is, why did he not try to use direct influence to make them solve their relations; if such a solution is possible after all?

The way the things are now, everything remains within the frameworks of attempts to restore the "principles" of the old communist practice of intervention "from the top," which is inconsistent with a policy that is constructing democratic conditions for the unobstructed functioning of the political system. Fortunately, it failed. Judging by the communication released by the Central Board of the SDSM, the SDSM adhered to the stances adopted at its previous session and did not cede to this kind of intervention, which was allegedly covered by the interests of the Macedonian state. That was normally, unless all this has not been the biggest political bluff of the last couple of years.

In spite of the attempts of Melpomeni Korneti [general manager of Macedonian Radio and Television] and Saso Ordanoski [Macedonian Television manager] to "dissociate" the dismissal of Korneti from the political context, in which Kiro Gligorov also participated through the media, the role of Macedonian journalism is apparently still unchanged and is built on the foundations of socialist information policy; it is but an arm of the ruling policy and it is used for accomplishing political interests (of groups, but sometimes of individuals).

Unfortunately, this is the reality of journalism in Macedonia. It is not only the present, but it will most probably remain this way for some time, considering how far it lags behind journalism in the rest of the world. This has the strongest effect on the catastrophic professional and social position of journalists. It is possible that they, that is, we, are also to be blamed for this situation. Nevertheless, the victims of the policy-journalism relations will continue to be—the journalists.

FYROM: Ethnic Animosities Complicate Redistricting

96BA0086C Skopje PULS in Macedonian 8 Dec 95 p 19

[Article by Jovan Pavlovski: "The 101st Township"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I fail to understand why the dear Slovenes have always and in all sorts of matters remember better than we do! This applies even when it is a question of the administrative-territorial division

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of our small countries: Slovenia had 62 townships whose average size was 372 square km with an average population of 28,000. Thirty years ago, we had more townships than we do now, but it seemed to us that they were small, for which reason we hastily reduced their number to 35, averaging 836 square km, and with an average population of 55,000! The Slovenes went further: last year the number of townships in their Republic of Slovenia was raised to 147! The logic used was practical and European: a small township meant a faster resolution of local problems. We, however, dragged behind with the type of Tetovo township which numbers more than 170,000 people!

Now, after the Law on Local Self-Government has been passed, we must pass a law which will set new township boundaries. However, in the already initiated discussions, we are confused by the fact that some 40 requests have already been filed. For instance, what will poor Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] do with some 60 townships?! I still believe that even 101 townships are not enough! I bear in mind the fact that we have complicated the present administrative machinery to such an extent that who knows what it will become should the number of townships be doubled. Therefore, along with the reorganization of the township network in the Republic, it is necessary to start discussing the reorganization of local state administrations.

In the last four to five years, I have repeatedly discussed the topic of the reorganization of Macedonian townships. This is not because I do not recognize them or base my theory on the defense of national interests. Perhaps this is not a theory, but it seems to me that it is the last and only hope for Macedonians in the townships with a substantial minority population not to feel like second-rate citizens. How can a person consider himself second-rate in his own country! Ignore various qualifications and labels, this issue is related to chauvinism and animosity towards Albanians, Turks, Serbians, Vlachs, or Gypsies, and down to the two Icelanders who have been registered as residents of the Republic of Macedonia by the Statistical Institute. Such stupidities only worsen my stomach ache!

Let me use the facts: according to last year's census, Tetovo township has a population of 174,748, of whom consist of about 131,000 Albanians, 36,000 Macedonians, slightly less than 4,000 Turks, some 2,500 Gypsies, and so on. From this point of view, it is normal that the tremendous majority, i.e., 40 percent are Albanians and only 10 percent Macedonians. It is entirely normal that all developments in the Assembly should put grist in the mill of the creation of a parallelism in government. If we take into consideration that in the city of Tetovo itself (population 50,376) the ratio between Macedonians and Albanians is 1 to 1, the basic question arises: with what right are the Macedonians in Tetovo deprived of the opportunity to participate in the administration of the city for the simple reason that the councilmen make decisions effecting both the city and the villages with a population of 124,372. Therefore, who can deprive Macedonians living in the Tetovo area villages of Tearce, Vratnica, Jegunovce, Brvenica, Lesok, Falise, Zelce, Jedoarce, Odri and many others from resolving their own problems, and who gives the right to others to ignore the major and minor anniversaries in national Macedonian history that directly effect the overall psychological state of Macedonians in Tetovo and its villages? It is clearly not a matter of indifference to the people of Tetovo, if in celebrating 19 November and Liberation Day, the Albanian chairman of the Assembly mentioned not a word that the city was liberated 50 years ago and by whom, or spoke of the fierce daily struggle which was being waged in the middle of November 1945.

That is why the number of townships must be increased. Such an increase must take into consideration the ethnic structure of the population, for if this is ignored, we shall be witnessing the sight of the crowded trains and buses with which Macedonians will abandon Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, or Struga. This may not happen in the next five years but it is bound to happen in the next twenty.

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Poland: Kwasniewski Sees No Rivalry in Central Europe

LD1302232696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Before his visit to Hungary, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski received Hungarian journalists, among them our correspondent Szabolcs Szilagyi in Warsaw. Now you can hear his interview.

[Szilagyi] In your election campaign, you spoke about Poland in the future. What are the most important issues?

[Kwasniewski in Polish, fading to Hungarian report] The most important issues are to sustain economic growth, to prepare social programs that create jobs and develop education, and to lead Poland to the European organizations, the EU and NATO. The Polish people can be united in this aim, independently from the question of whom they voted for.

[Szilagyi] Then I asked President Kwasniewski whether he could see a rivalry among the countries of our region in trying to win over foreign capital.

[Kwasniewski in Polish, fading to Hungarian report] This competition for foreign capital investments is natural, the Polish president said. In his view, significant foreign partners look at our countries—the common Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak market, the Central European Free Trade Association, in particular—as a community. The most important thing is that there is no difference between the endeavors of our citizens. There is no question of any rivalry between Poles and Hungarians. For, as Kwasniewski also said, these four states will join the EU and NATO simultaneously, more or less together.

Poland: President Asks Poles To Trust New Government

LD1402131396 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Assessing the prime minister's policy statement, President Aleksander Kwasniewski told a news conference in the Sejm building that he hopes the Sejm and the public will give Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's government credit of trust, so that his Cabinet can survive until the parliamentary elections in mid 1997.

The president stressed that this is needed to enable the government to present a full account of the coalition's achievements from 1993. He said that both he and the coalition take full responsibility for this government's work.

According to Aleksander Kwasniewski, it will be an important challenge for Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's government to convince the coalition partner [Polish Peasant Party] and the opposition that the reform of the social security system and health care and the restructuring program for the mining sector and the arms industry, among other things, are moving in the right direction.

In the president's opinion, the development of the political situation in Russia and the United States in connection with the presidential elections in those countries may constitute an external threat to the new government.

Poland: Prime Minister Interviewed on Policies

WS1302143196 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 10 Feb 96 pp 14-16

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz by Janina Paradowska and Wladyslaw Wladyka; place and date not given: "Briskly Toward the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [POLITYKA] Jozef Oleksy's government developed various reform projects. Do you intend to stick to them as they are, or will you amend them?

[Cimoszewicz] I intend to proceed with the most important projects, but I have to take a closer look at several others. I want my government to carry out the reform of the social security and health-care systems, probably also of the state administration. I also support the reorganization of the economic administrative center. If, however, I am to be held fully responsible, I have to know exactly what I am doing and must approve of the implemented projects.

[POLITYKA] Together with [Chief Editor of GAZETA WYBORCZA] Adam Michnik, you recently appealed to the political camps to unite. Today you are the head of the Cabinet at a time when political attitudes are sharply polarized, when any sort of unity seems impossible. What role do you think you can play in this situation?

[Cimoszewicz] Perhaps this is a good time to play a positive role. I think we need much more dialogue in Poland; there is not enough willingness to talk. It is very important to talk to each other, even if it is impossible to reach an agreement. Talking can eliminate the risk of large-scale conflicts. We still tend to box rather than play chess.

[POLITYKA] What scale of political openness would you accept in order to start eliminating the aforesaid polarization? Is this the right time to open up? Today

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everyone tends to pull their ranks together and defend themselves.

[Cimoszewicz] The first comments made by politicians of the opposition, as well as people who are not politicians but who take part in public life, indicate that reactions to my mission of forming the government are not bad. The reaction to the platform we present will naturally be most important, but I can already say that I do not see any indication that contacts might be broken off. On the contrary, the climate seems favorable for dialogue. Does this mean there are chances for political openness? I think they are limited. The political structure of my Cabinet is lucid: This is a government of the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party [SLD-PSL] coalition. I do believe, however, that even this configuration leaves room for solutions pertaining to platforms, as well as personnel issues that do not have to be a direct outcome of the very simplistic understanding of what the coalition really stands for and what the profits are for the groups it is made up of. [passage omitted]

Various opinions have been formulated lately on the recent developments in Poland. Some go as far as to say that we are dealing with a state crisis. The political crisis that has led to the recent government crisis should not be dismissed lightly, yet it is not tantamount to a crisis of state structures. We may speak at most of a crisis of some of the elements of the state structures. There is, however, the problem of the credibility of the state. It has not come out of nowhere; this is a problem that has been growing for years and only recently reached an unprecedented scale. The only exception to the rule that the credibility of the state is low was, to my belief, the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, especially in the first months. The subsequent changes of governments and parliaments, notorious conflicts, and evident lack of authority led to the undermining of the credibility of politicians, the majority of public figures, and the institutions these people were part of—in other words, state authorities.

This is a serious problem, which I wish to speak about in my Sejm address. For various reasons, we in Poland have not yet matured to solutions calling for more political imagination and continue to cling to old political configurations. This is not bad in itself, but sometimes it is insufficient to meet all of the challenges. Under the circumstances, the solution lies not only in the composition of the government, but also in its performance and responsibilities. I hope that my approach to public duties, my way of thinking about the law, about the dire necessity of observing legitimate practices, my respect for the distribution of competences of various state institutions is a harbinger of the type of policies many Poles are waiting for.

[POLITYKA] You said we are undergoing a crisis of certain elements of state structures. Which ones?

[Cimoszewicz] This is, among others, the problem of the positioning of the secret services and their subordination to proper control. I do not connect this with the recent developments, yet it is a fact that, despite the establishment of a special Sejm commission for the control of the secret services—the Office of State Protection as well as the Military Information Services—this problem has not yet been settled. We have to have secret services that are capable of performing intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks. Everyone, those in power and the opposition alike, should trust that the special services will not become a political instrument in anyone's hands. I can honestly say I am not absolutely certain that the current degree of control over these services gives all of our citizens a sense of security. [passage omitted]

[POLITYKA] What do you think about vetting, now that it has been so vehemently taken up again?

[Cimoszewicz] I have mixed feelings. Considering that the question of vetting keeps reccurring, that slander is beginning to play an ever larger role in our public life, I think the issue should be finally resolved. Unless we resolve it, we will face a risk that public interests will be seriously threatened by continuous convulsions, charges, and suspicions. On the other hand, if mistakes are made in the process of specifying the legal and evidentiary rules of vetting mechanisms, we might cause a situation in which those mechanisms themselves would trigger further convulsions and charges and could be used for political purposes. That is why all of the rules and procedures have to be defined very carefully. It also has to be decided who is to oversee the vetting process. It seems more obvious who is to be vetted and what types of charges qualify for vetting.

[POLITYKA] Mr. Prime Minister, a politician is defined by his personal traits, such as his character, intelligence, and elocution. Yet his strength depends also on his environment. Your situation seems atypical. It is said that you are a political loner, that you are detached even in your immediate political surroundings. Who is standing behind you?

[Cimoszewicz] If you understand political environment as a party, group, or a large number of political allies, my situation is indeed atypical. I do, however, feel strongly connected with the group I was cofounder of—the SLD. Even though I often differed in opinions with many of my colleagues, I think I always remained loyal

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to them. My guideline was the public interest and the interests of this group. [passage omitted]

[POLITYKA] There is also the issue of the strength of this coalition and relations between the SLD and the PSL. The PSL has a visible inferiority complex toward the SLD; the two parties seem to distrust each other. It is sometimes very difficult to see partnership within the coalition.

[Cimoszewicz] The partnership was often impaired because of poor information and neglecting the nurturing of mutual respect. Even during meetings at the highest level between the PSL and the SLD, you could sense the same sort of feelings that couples who have been married for very long know well, when a single word or gesture is enough to cause reproach and a quarrel, a chiding for past mistakes. This is where the coalition has arrived after two years. I will try to prevent that by resorting to my tried principles. I think that in politics, ambiguous tactics, tricks, and games are disclosed sooner or later, even if they do seem effective in the short run. Trust is lost as a result, resentment sets in, and politics cease to be effective. So I am and will remain open to my colleagues from the coalition. However, I do intend to apply the principle that, if I am to be prime minister, no one will absolve me from the responsibilities this office entails nor deprive me of the privileges it brings with it.

[POLITYKA] It is often said that your government has to survive until the parliamentary elections, with the stress on "survive."

[Cimoszewicz] I hope I can make it until the elections marching briskly.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: PSL Undecided on Vote of Confidence in Cabinet

LD1302210096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Almost the entire opposition has announced it will reject Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's policy statement, which the prime minister is to deliver in the Sejm on 14 February. It is also not known how the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will vote. Janusz Piechocinski, deputy chairman of the PSL parliamentary floor group, said his group had not yet decided on the matter. In his opinion, the decision will depend on the contents of the prime minister's statement.

[Begin Piechocinski recording] So far we have received contradictory information with regard to the way the coalition agreement should be implemented—for example, statements made by Kaczmarek [privatization minister] and the decision to appoint Mr. Siemiatkowski to the post of minister of internal affairs. We have a lot to think about. [end recording]

Poland: Miners Reject Proposed Pay Increase

LD1302221696 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Solidarity miners have not accepted the wage increase proposed by the employers and decided not to suspend the industrial action. During the talks in Katowice, the employers suggested that the profits from increased coal production could be earmarked for pay raises. The trade union members have said that the protest action could be stepped up. Talks are to resume 14 February.

Solidarity railway workers have said that they will blockade coal transports at border crossings if there is an attempt to import it from Ukraine.

The strike at the Silesian collieries is in its ninth day. The collieries belonging to the Nadwislanska and Rybnicka companies and two collieries from the Bytomska company have stopped the dispatch of coal.

Poland: Commission Urges Dropping Martial Law Proceedings

LD1302175696 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1504 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Feb (PAP)—The [Sejm] Constitutional Accountability Commission decided on Tuesday that it would propose to the Sejm that it drop proceedings against the architects of martial law. Jacek Taylor of Freedom Union said the opposition minority parties would submit a motion on this matter.

The Sejm will make the final decision on whether those covered by preliminary charges regarding the imposition and execution of martial law should face the state tribunal or have proceedings against them dropped.

On 13 February five deputies voted to make the following generals of the Military National Salvation Council constitutionally responsible for the actions: Wojciech Jaruzelski, Tadeusz Hupalowski, Czeslaw Piotrowski, and Michal Janiszewski. There were 12 votes against and one abstention. Five deputies again were in favor of making General Czeslaw Kiszczak appear before the State Tribunal, while 10 were against and three abstained.

Proceedings against the following members of the Council of State were dropped unanimously: Jan Szczepanski, Stanislaw Wronski, and Ryszard Reif in

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connection with the imposition of martial law. The result of the voting in relation to the other members of the Council: Five were in favor of making them stand trial, 12 were against, and one abstained. Regarding the charge of passing four decrees [on the imposition of martial law without involving the Sejm] while the Sejm was in session, five deputies were in favor of making the remaining members face the state tribunal while 11 were against and two abstained.

Jerzy Wiatr of the Democratic Left Alliance, chairman of the commission, said that "neither before nor after the war did the Sejm have to deal with a matter that had been as complex as the matter of the architects of martial law."

Poland: Russian-Made Helicopters Received From Germany

LD1302180096 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 13 Feb 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army aircraft plant in Lodz has received 12 combat helicopters, Mi-24D's, which the Defense Ministry received free from the Bundeswehr. The planes were earlier part of the GDR army equipment. Six such helicopters arrived in Lodz in December.

[Correspondent] All of the helicopters arrived by train. Four years ago they were withdrawn from the German army and mothballed. Two engines will be taken apart for spare parts. The helicopters were manufactured in the USSR 18 and 13 years ago. In those days, that type of aircraft was part of the equipment of our Armed Forces.

The Lodz plant is to repair three helicopters a year. They should remain operational for another eight years. Our Army is equipped with 30 combat Mi-24 helicopters . Two helicopter regiments are equipped with them: one in Pruszcz Gdanski and one in Inowroclaw.

Poland: Need for Agricultural Restructuring Discussed

96EP0023F Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 2 Jan 96 pp 8-9

[Article by Janusz K. Kowalski, published under the rubric "Predictions 1996": "The Farmer Is Still Powerful"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The market economy has not changed the obsolete and neglected structure of Polish agriculture. Weak farms producing low-grade raw materials still predominate in this country, and farm owners cannot find any other way of making a living.

In Poland there are more than 2 million private farms averaging nearly 7 hectares in area. Most of them are diversified and include one or two cows, several hogs, and poultry. At the same time, more than one-half of the farms are unrelated to the market; they do not sell and do not buy. In many farmsteads of this kind the sole source of income is old age pensions. Of the remaining farms, 27 percent sell up to 40 percent of their output, only 4 percent sell more than 61 percent, and 2 percent sell more than 81 percent of their output. The Polish farmer feeds eight people, whereas a European Union farmer feeds 36, a United States farmer feeds 64, and an Israeli farmer feeds 90.

This backwardness of Polish farming is reflected in the equally backward Polish countryside. There are about 60,000 village communities, of which barely 42,000 have names of their own. That is because of the prevalence of tiny hamlets and colonies. The average Polish village has a population of 250, with every sixth village having fewer than 100 inhabitants and only 6 percent having more than 1,000 inhabitants each. This situation complicates the development of infrastructure and various forms of local enterprise.

Investing in the countryside is also difficult for other reasons. At many villages there is a shortage of good water, power lines are not adapted to large power intakes, and there are shortages of suitable roads, banks (those that do exist are savings and loan associations), notary offices, district employment offices, legal and economic counseling, regional development agencies, and planning offices. There is also a shortage of the skilled manpower required at up-to-date manufacturing plants. Instead, the predominant model is that of the self-taught peasant with his "golden thumb" who can do anything. Moreover, the countryside is dominated by traditional attitudes of a lack of faith in the ability to pull yourself up by your own bootstraps, combined with envy and jealousy of those who are successful.

In the opinion of Katarzyna Duczkowska Malysz, deputy minister of agriculture, no one at her ministry needs to be persuaded to favor a many-sided development of rural areas. New jobs other than farming should be created there. But that will be a time-consuming, difficult, and costly process. Hence no major changes in the picture of the Polish countryside and the Polish farmer should be expected in the year ahead.

GUS [Main Office of Statistics] figures indicate that in the last five years of the transformation, about 180,000 private farms have disappeared, and the arable area of the average farm has increased to 6.9 hectares from

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6.3 (by about 10 percent). It was chiefly the farms measuring from 2 to 10 hectares in area that decreased in number. On the other hand, the number of small farms (up to 2 hectares) and large ones (10 and more hectares) has increased. The changes are taking place slowly. Their pace so far indicates that by the end of the century the number of farms in Poland will continue to be close to 2 million. However, most of their present-day owners will have to combine work on the farm with the exercise of another occupation, and some, owing to their age, will benefit from the government's social support. Nothing indicates that in 1996 the distance separating us from the countries of the EU will diminish; in these countries the average farm measures 16.5 hectares. In Great Britain the average farm measures 68.9 hectares, and in Denmark 32.5 hectares.

According to experts from the Institute of Research into Democracy and Private Enterprise, the current level of development of the Polish countryside does not warrant leaving it without assistance from the government and letting it rely solely on market mechanisms. However, that assistance should be channeled chiefly to the most active individuals and the best farms which have a chance of growing. Fewer resources should be allotted for social support and more for programs spurring various forms of economic activity in the countryside.

Yet, for their part, farmers, accustomed in the past era to receiving subsidies, amortizable credit, and nearly free land allotments, believe that subsidies are the best form of assistance for agriculture. Thus, they demand of the current government preferential credit, farm subsidies, the retention of low taxes, and expanded social care. And although huge funds are allocated for these purposes, farmers are dissatisfied, as was made clear in the presidential elections, during which the representative of the peasant party gained few votes in the countryside. Yet the draft budget for 1996 earmarks as much as 2.859 billion zlotys for agriculture and the food industry, which is 23.4 percent more than in 1995. In addition, there are the huge subsidies for the KRUS (Farmers' Social Insurance Agency) and the ZUS (Social Insurance Administration), totaling 7.8892 billion zlotys.

Thus, the very magnitude of the agricultural supports envisaged in the budget demonstrates that the farmer retains "the clout, and that's it." However, that "clout" will fade, and this is an inevitable process, because the number of farmers in this country will diminish, as has occurred throughout the civilized world. Only then can their incomes grow. For now, real farm incomes per capita are more than 20 percent below the incomes of worker families.

Farm employment in this country accounts for more than 26 percent of total employment (compared with about 6 percent in the EU). Given such a level of employment we have no chance of competing with the agriculture of the EU countries. Moreover, the Central Planning Office has calculated that, compared with Western European countries, we apply only one-half to one-third the amount of artificial fertilizers per hectare of farmland, our wheat and rye harvests are half as big per hectare, our potato and sugar beet harvests are even lower, and the milk yield of our cows is similarly half as high or less. That distance, too, will be difficult to overcome in 1996. Nevertheless, Poland, not so long ago a country of food shortages, has been producing food surpluses in recent years, and this is going to continue. Thus, in the year ahead there will be no problems with the food supply for the market. On the other hand, farmers will complain about the difficulty of selling all that they produce. The EU countries will continue to protect themselves against the—in their opinion—considerable influx of Polish foodstuffs, while the growth in our exports to the East will entail risks as regards the solvency of our partners there. Nevertheless, in 1996 it will still be difficult to find a farmer who would abandon his land for the sake of a better-paying occupation.

Farm Spending Envisaged in 1996 Draft Budget (in millions of zlotys, unless otherwise indicated)

	1995	Projected 1996	1996 (1995 = 100)
I. Overall expenditures (exclusive of ZUS and KRUS)	2.3155 billion	2.859 billion*	123.4
1. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry (Item 19)	1.2377 billion	1.6252 billion	131.3
—Grants for biological progress	196.4	248.2	126.4
—Subsidies for operations of the Farm Restructuring and Modernization Agency	248.0	459.5	161.8

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	1995	Projected 1996	1996 (1995 = 100)
—BS-ASAL loan	70.0	77.0	110.0
2. Ministry of Finance, subsidies for the production and transportation of commercial lime (Item 0.8)	135.0	175.0	129.6
3. Agricultural Market Agency	241.3	289.5	120.0
4. Subsidizing interest rates on preferential farm credit, total (current)	440.0**	397.7	90.2
5.Consolidated budget of the voivodships	595.0	720.3	121.1
II. Subsidies for KRUS and ZUS	6.3549 billion	7.8892 billion	124.1

FOOTNOTES: * Exclusive of expenditures on the rural census, for which 60,000 zlotys out of the funds earmarked for agriculture have been transmitted to GUS (Main Office of Statistics); ** Including drought loans

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Romania: Iliescu Receives Hungarian Secretary of State

AU1402101396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The basic political treaty and President Ion Iliescu's initiative on a Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation were the two main topics of the talks held in Bucharest by Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Hungarian dignitary met today with his Romanian counterpart, Marcel Dinu, and also held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu. This evening, he was received by President Ion Iliescu at Cotroceni Palace.

In a press statement made after the meeting with the Romanian foreign minister, the Hungarian secretary of state said that the two sides acknowledged the political will to relaunch negotiations on the still pending points of the basic political treaty and to begin expert-level meetings on the Romanian initiative for a historic Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation.

Romania: Iliescu, Hungary's Somogyi Discuss Treaty

AU1402102196 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's President Ion Iliescu today received Mr. Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Romanian head of state welcomed the start of the negotiation process — at the level of secretaries of state in the two ministries of foreign affairs — on the documents worked out in the wake of the Romanian head of state's initiative on a Romanian-Hungarian historic reconciliation; he also welcomed the continuation of negotiations on the basic political treaty. The sides emphasized the joint interest of Romania and Hungary to place their relations on a lasting foundation. They expressed the conviction that, proceeding from these joint interests, the negotiators will find, as soon as possible, mutually acceptable formulas in these documents, which should reflect the interests of both states.

The sides also exchanged views on the stage of bilateral relations. They noted the progress made in various fields of activity and the prospects for further progress in the integration process of the two countries in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions — a communique received from the presidency reads.

At a joint news conference held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters tonight, Mr. Marcel Dinu, Romanian secretary of state, said that, during the talks with his Hungarian counterpart, the sides agreed that negotiations on the historical reconciliation and partnership between Romania and Hungary and on the code of behavior on minority issues should take place at the end of February, at the expert level. He also said that talks to finalize the basic political treaty will be resumed at the beginning of March.

In his turn, the Hungarian diplomat stressed the Budapest government's desire to finalize the process of signing the relevant documents and to concretely participate in their implementation. At the same time, the guest said that there is no need for the integration of the two countries in the Euro-Atlantic structures to proceed in keeping with a parallel timetable. He considered it an erroneous idea that Hungary's integration in these structures before Romania would have a destabilizing effect. Mr. Somogyi also said that the Hungarian side considered March as an ideal time to sign the basic treaty. He added that a meeting between President Ion Iliescu and Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn is likely to take place during that month, for the purpose of signing the treaty — our correspondent reports.

Romania: Nastase Considers UDMR Possible Ally

AU1302203696 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 7 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Ioana Lupea: "Adrian Nastase Attacks His Former Fellow Party Member Petre Roman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "By running for the presidency, Petre Roman is gambling the Democratic Party's [PD] last chance," his former fellow member in the National Salvation Front [FSN], Adrian Nastase, [executive president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania-PDSR] said at a news conference on 6 February. The PDSR president has thus continued his attack against the PD. "Although he claims to be a candidate for the future, the PD leader will have to explain his post-December 1989 past." This statement is most revealing about the way in which the PDSR plans to treat Petre Roman, the former stray sheep, in the forthcoming electoral campaign, which Nastase said would be tough. "Tough" was also the term used to characterize the PDSR reaction to the PD's accusation about the PDSR's alleged plans to falsify the electoral results. Adrian Nastase said he will fight this "dirty idea" launched by Petre Roman's party, who is thus "trying to gather excuses for his future failure." From enemies, the PDSR president proceeded to talk about a potential partner, namely, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], which has allegedly realized that Maniu's [Iuliu Maniu, founder of the Romanian Peasants' Party and pre-World War II prime minister] philosophy does not suit it. "Why should the UDMR call for autonomy if it becomes a

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government party?" Nastase asked. Nevertheless, to be admitted to Victoria Palace [the government seat], the UDMR will have to accept the Constitution in its entirety, as well as the prefects of Harghita and Covasna counties.

The Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] Is Not a Serious Countercandidate for the PDSR

Nothing has changed in the relationship between the PDSR and PUNR. Viorel Hrebenciuc, the government's general secretary and the manager of the electoral campaign, does not consider the PUNR as a serious countercandidate, as that party is not able to put forward a coherent strategy. According to Adrian Nastase, the Turicu case [recently dismissed PUNR minister of communications] proves that the PDSR knows how to control its members. Indeed, both the government and President Ion Iliescu yielded to the decision of the PDSR Permanent Delegation, which recommended that Turicu be dismissed. At the start of next week, the leaderships of the two government parties will meet with Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu. It is possible that Funar [PUNR president] will present the PUNR candidates for the post of minister of telecommunications.

In the meantime, Mircea Cosea, the interim telecommunications minister, will take care to ensure the legitimacy of the competition for the management board of the ROMTELECOM company. He will decide whether Ioan Ovidiu Muntean, the ROMTELECOM director appointed by Turicu, should be dismissed or not.

The PDSR Candidates for the Local Elections Should Be Pragmatical

The PDSR leaders claim that the recent visits in the provinces are not of an electoral nature, but rather aimed at taking the pulse of the local organizations, which are in charge of putting together the lists for the local elections. If Oliviu Gherman [PDSR president] recently recommended that incorruptible people should be chosen, Adrian Nastase considers that pragmatism should be the main quality of the candidates. The PDSR has taken a first important step in this electoral campaign. Yesterday, journalist Anca Alexandrescu from EVENIMENTUL ZILEI was officially appointed the party's spokesperson.

Romania: Senate, Chamber Elect New Leaderships

AU1402105096 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Feb 96 p 5

[Article by Bogdan Tiberiu Iacob and Marcela Feraru: "Although Yesterday He Fought Tooth and Nail for a Seat, C.V. Tudor Left the Senate Leadership Through the Back Door"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, during the last session of the current legislature, the Senate appointed the new leadership structure, that is, the 11 members of the Senate's Standing Bureau.

No changes have taken place at the level of the positions of the four vice presidents and the two questors [financial official]. The vice presidents remained Ion Solcanu (Social Democracy Party of Romania — PDSR), Radu Vasile (National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party — PNTCD), Valer Suian (Romanian National Unity Party — PUNR), and Dan Vasiliu (Democratic Party — PD), while the questors are Constantin Sava (PDSR) and Florin Velicu (Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania — PDAR). However, the appointment of the new secretaries provoked a big scandal, as a result of which Corneliu Vadim Tudor [president of Greater Romanian Party — PRM] and Adrian Paunescu [vice president of Socialist Party of Labor —PSM] left the hall.

As a result of the votes, the seats held by C.V. Tudor and Florin Buruiana (PDAR) were taken, through a crushing majority of votes, by Ioan Paun Ottiman (Civic Alliance Party — PAC) and Aristotel Cancescu (PD).

The Social Democratic Union Has Now Three Representatives in the Standing Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies

As a result of the yesterday votes for the Standing Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies, the PRM has lost its seat in the leading forum of the legislative body, a seat that in the last sessions was offered to it by the PDSR from the proportional quota it held.

The structure of the Standing Bureau after yesterday's votes is the following: the vice presidents are Dan Martian (PDSR), Radu Berceanu (PD), Ion Ratiu (PNTCD), and Ioan Gavra (PUNR); the secretaries are Ovidiu Petrescu (PDSR), Viorica Afrasinei (Romanian Social-Democratic Party — PSDR), Alexandru Hamar Konya (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania — UDMR), and Emil Putin (PSDR); and the questors are Emil Stoica (PDSR), Cristian Radulescu (PD), Sorin Lepsa (PNTCD), and Mitica Balaet (PSM).

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